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PREFACE 
 
The main theme of this thesis work is to evaluate the possibility of achieving a safe and cost 
efficient P&A operation by the use of small intervention facilities (vessels). The synergy of 
the oil industry is toward IOR of subsea wells by reducing operational costs without affecting 
HSE related issues. The technology available today is scrutinized to see if the viable technical 
solutions will provide a successful P&A operation of subsea wells as performed normally by 
drilling rigs. Regulatory bodies have set stringent requirements for eternal abandonment of 
subsea oil wells, such that the sealing arrangement should be constructed to avoid oil seepage 
into ground water reserves and pollution of the environment.  
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ABSTRACT 
The main objective of this thesis is to evaluate challenges in satisfying rules and regulations 
set by regulatory bodies, constrains related to the well status as well as the limitation of 
technology available to perform plugging and abandonment activities. IOSS and NCA have 
joined resources in development of state of the art technology especially for full 
commercialization in P&A operations. It is required to provide suitable technical solutions to 
show to the authority that P&A for shut in well category 2&3 can normally be performed 
safely and successfully by fit for purpose intervention facilities as accomplished by drilling 
rigs. This will be a favorable solution for oil operating companies taking into consideration 
their determination toward IOR philosophy for subsea wells.     
 
Safety authorities require a good quality of P&A operation that provides an eternal sealing 
arrangement to isolate reservoir fluids migration up to the sea surface. Therefore primary 
strategy was to establish a clear understanding of the state of a shut in well to be abandoned 
and the means to establish barriers to control well pressure prior to commencement of the 
P&A campaign as required by the authorities. A thorough study of guidelines related to 
selection and location of WBE is dealt with, especially the technology available for 
deployment of tools downhole when setting plugs. This forms the design bases for top side 
equipment capability needed for handling heavy lifts of subsea WCP packages, SLIS or riser 
system and BHA while performing P&A activities.  
 
Based on evaluation of the state of the art of technology available today and exploration of the 
scope of work required to be accomplished on P&A operation for shut in well category 1 to 3, 
it is recommended that permanent abandonment by use of small intervention facilities be done 
since is as well economically a viable solution.   
 
The major constrain in this work was the limitation in acquiring technical information for 
P&A operation since most of the information and experience available is not well shared in 
the industry and lack of supporting literature. It was necessary to gather technical information 
from experienced personnel who directly have been involved or performed P&A operations. 
This was a challenge and led into set back in the thesis work since most of the crew dealing 
with WOI operations was located offshore.  
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Subsea development still is a developing arena; therefore there is insufficient supporting 
literature for P&A activities compared to offshore oil fields developed with platform based 
concept and onshore oil fields. This necessitated an approach of interviewing experienced 
people and seek of professional advice, therefore, some parts of this thesis is based on 
interview material.  
 
In total there were 4 interviews conducted in Stavanger in the period of January to May 2009, 
each of length of minimum 1 hour. Three vis-à-vis interviews were with persons from 
Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA/Ptil), Island Offshore ASA, Nose Cutting and 
Abandonment (NCA) and one telephone interview was with Aker Solutions ASA. The issues 
discussed are enclosed in attachment 1, however, there were some modifications of them 
made while the interview was taking place in order to attain more thorough information. An 
example of 1 full interview answers is presented in attachment 2. The arguments attained 
from interviews gave a valuable contribution to the whole thesis and are not referred to 
particularly.  
 
Important input was made also from the first supervisor Prof. Arnfinn Nergaard and the 
second supervisor related to the industry, Mr. Harald Strand.  
 
Review of available literature was made: the sources were scientific papers, e.g. publications 
by SPE International, books, laws, regulations, lectures’ notes in subjects Subsea Control, 
Marine Operations, Well Completion and Well Intervention, as well as material available on 
the internet.  
 
During the process of the thesis work it was necessary to come up with diagrams which 
present simpler the processes involved in establishing the primary condition of well status and 
evaluating possible P&A procedures.  
Cost and Safety Efficient Plugging and Abandonment of Subsea Wells by a Smaller Vessel 
 
 
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENT 
 
 
PREFACE .................................................................................................................................................. i 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ............................................................................................................................ ii 
ABSTRACT .............................................................................................................................................. iii 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................. iv 
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................... 1 
1.0  ESTABLISH NORMAL STATUS OF SHUT IN WELLS ..................................................................... 2 
1.1  CATEGORIZATION SYSTEM ...................................................................................................... 2 
1.2  WELL STATUS PARAMETERS .................................................................................................... 3 
1.3  LOAD CASES AND RISK ASSESSMENT ....................................................................................... 4 
1.4  LEAK POSSIBILITIES ................................................................................................................. 5 
2.0  HANDLING POSSIBLY ENCOUNTERED TRAPPED HYDROCARBONS AND NON- RESERVOIR 
PRESSURE IN ANNULI SPACES. ............................................................................................................... 6 
2.1  SOURCE OF TRAPPED GAS AND HYDROCARBON LIQUIDS IN ANNULI SPACES .......................... 6 
2.1.1  IMPROPER MUD DISPLACEMENT ..................................................................................... 6 
2.1.2  GAS MIGRATION THROUGH UNSET CEMENT .................................................................. 7 
2.1.3  CEMENT SHEATH FAILURE .............................................................................................. 7 
2.2  SAFE METHODS FOR HANDLING TRAPPED GAS AND HYDROCARBONS UNDER PRESSURE IN 
ANNULI SPACES. .................................................................................................................................. 7 
2.2.1  CONVENTIONAL/ NORMAL SCP BLEED OFF SYSTEM APPLIED ON DRILLING RIGS. .......... 8 
2.2.2  ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGY APPLIED ON WI VESSEL HANDLING SCP. ..................... 12 
3.0  ESTABLISH OVERALL PROCEDURE FOR ENTIRE OPERATION SEEN FROM THE WELL ASPECT.
 14 
3.1  PLANNING AND REGULATORY CONSENT FOR P&A PROGRAMME FOR SUBSEA WELLS. ........ 14 
3.2  PLUG SETTING ........................................................................................................................ 15 
3.3  FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED WHEN PLANNING A SAFETY EFFICIENT P&A PROGRAM FOR 
SUBSEA WELLS. ................................................................................................................................. 16 
3.3.1  P&A PROGRAM FOR SHUT IN WELL CATEGORY 1: RIG CHASE (WH PICK; 30”+20”) ... 16 
3.3.2  P&A PROGRAM FOR SHUT IN WELL CATEGORY 2 ......................................................... 18 
3.3.3  ESTABLISHMENT OF INITIAL CONDITION FOR SHUT IN WELL CATEGORY 3. ................ 23 
3.4  TH AND PRODUCTION TUBING CLEANING ............................................................................. 29 
3.5  WIRELINE SET PLUG AND PACKER ......................................................................................... 30 
3.6  CEMENTING ........................................................................................................................... 30 
3.7  REMOVAL OF DOWN-HOLE AND SUBSEA EQUIPMENT ........................................................... 30 
4.0  GENERAL ABOUT THE SET OF REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES FOR CONSTRUCTION OF 
VESSELS AND MOBILE FACILITIES ....................................................................................................... 31 
4.1  VESSELS ................................................................................................................................. 31 
4.2  MOBILE FACILITY .................................................................................................................. 32 
4.3  THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A VESSEL AND A FACILITY......................................................... 33 
4.3.1  HULL AND REQUIREMENTS FOR CONSTRUCTION MATERIAL (STEEL GRADE) ................ 33 
4.3.2  DAMAGE STABILITY AND BALLAST SYSTEM ................................................................. 34 
4.3.3  WORKING ENVIRONMENT WITH RESPECT TO NOISE, VIBRATIONS AND ILLUMINATION 
CONDITIONS .................................................................................................................................. 34 
4.3.4  ANCHORAGE / DYNAMIC POSITIONING WITH RESPECT TO DP CLASS ............................ 35 
4.3.5  INTERIOR REQUIREMENTS FOR CORRIDORS, DOORS AND LADDER ................................ 35 
4.3.6  MACHINERY AND EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY ............................................................ 35 
4.3.7  STRICTER REQUIREMENTS FOR LIFE SAVING APPLIANCES ............................................ 36 
Cost and Safety Efficient Plugging and Abandonment of Subsea Wells by a Smaller Vessel 
 
 
vi 
 
4.3.8  FIRE-, GAS DETECTION PROTECTION/PREVENTION SYSTEM .......................................... 36 
4.3.9  MANNING REQUIREMENTS WITH RESPECT TO TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION ............. 36 
4.3.10  ERGONOMIC DESIGN ...................................................................................................... 37 
4.4  REGULATIONS IN THE PETROLEUM ACT WITH REGARD TO APPLICATION ON A VESSEL OR 
FACILITY ............................................................................................................................................ 37 
4.5  COST EVALUATION FOR WELL INTERVENTION BY THE USE OF MOBILE FACILITIES .............. 38 
4.5.1  MOBILIZATION OF A MOBILE FACILITY ......................................................................... 39 
4.5.2  WEATHER/CLIMATIC CONDITION................................................................................... 39 
4.5.3  COMPARISON OF DRIFT COSTS/ CHARGES PER DAY FOR MOBILE FACILITIES. ............... 40 
4.5.4  SCOPE OF INTERVENTION ACTIVITY TO BE PERFORMED. ............................................... 41 
4.5.5  SECTION MILLING OPERATION ....................................................................................... 41 
5.0  ESTABLISHMENT AND DESCRIPTION OF MOBILE FACILITY EQUIPMENT PACKAGE FOR 
WELL INTERVENTION. ......................................................................................................................... 42 
5.1  WELL WORKOVER AND INTERVENTION ................................................................................ 42 
5.1.1  DEFINITION .................................................................................................................... 42 
5.1.2  DEPLOYMENT TECHNOLOGY ......................................................................................... 43 
5.1.3  MAINTENANCE ON SEABED EQUIPMENTS ...................................................................... 43 
5.1.4  COMMON PROBLEMS EXPECTED TO BE ENCOUNTERED DURING EXECUTION OF 
INTERVENTION OPERATIONS ......................................................................................................... 44 
5.2  PROCEDURES AND LINE OF COMMUNICATION PRIOR TO INITIATION OF SUBSEA WELL 
INTERVENTION. ................................................................................................................................. 44 
5.3  DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM COMPONENTS FOR RLWIS ........................................................... 45 
5.3.1  SUBSEA INTERVENTION STACK CONFIGURATION .......................................................... 45 
5.3.2  PROCEDURE FOR RUNNING BHA FOR WIRELINE (RLWI).............................................. 46 
5.3.3  BARRIER PHILOSOPHY / WELL STATUS .......................................................................... 46 
5.4  STATE OF THE ART IN TECHNOLOGY ADVANCEMENT............................................................ 46 
5.4.1  GENERAL ....................................................................................................................... 47 
5.4.2  KILL SYSTEM WITH MANIFOLD AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT ..................................... 48 
5.4.3  THE MUD SYSTEM .......................................................................................................... 48 
5.5  RISERLESS WELL INTERVENTION CONTROL SYSTEM (MARK II) .......................................... 49 
5.6  COILED TUBING OPERATION .................................................................................................. 50 
5.6.1  DESIGN DATA/SPECIFICATION PER SYSTEM TOPSIDE .................................................... 50 
5.6.2  DESIGN DATA/SPECIFICATION FOR SYSTEM SUBSEA .................................................... 52 
5.6.3  BARRIER PHILOSOPHY ................................................................................................... 54 
5.7  LIMITATION WITH RESPECT TO AVAILABLE DECK SPACE ...................................................... 55 
6.0  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................. 56 
7.0  RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH WORK .......................................................... 57 
REFERENCES 
ATTACHMENTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cost and Safety Efficient Plugging and Abandonment of Subsea Wells by a Smaller Vessel 
 
 
vii 
 
NOMENCLATURE 
 
AoC – Acknowlogement of Compliance 
AWS – Aker Well Solution 
BHA – Bottom Hole Assembly 
BOP-Blow-out Preventor 
CT – Coile Tubing 
CTF – Coile tubing frame  
DNV- Det Norsk Veritas 
DP class – Dynamic Positioning clas 
DP Control-Dew Point Control 
EDP – Emergency Disconnection Package 
EQD – Emergency Quick Disconnection 
ESD- Emergency Shut Down 
GOM – Gulf of Mexico 
GSF – Gimbal Support Frame 
HC - Hydrocarbon 
HMI – Human Machine Interface  
HPU – Hydrauli Power Unit 
HSE-Health Safety and Environment 
HSLV – Higher Set Lubricator Valve 
HXT –Horizontal ChristmasTree 
IMCT – Internal Multi-string Cutting Tool 
IMO-International Maritime Organization  
IOM – Island Offshore Management 
IOR-Improved Oil Recovery 
IOSS – Island Offshore Sub Sea AS 
ISO-International Standard Organization 
IWOCS – Intervention Workover and Control System 
LLP – Lower Lubricator Package 
LMRP – Lower Marine Riser Package 
LPIV – Lubricator Pre 
LS –Lubricator Section 
MGS – Mud Gas Separator 
MHS – Module Handling System  
MHT – Module Handling Tower 
MPSV – Multi purpose Sevirce Vessel 
NCA – Norse Cutting and Abandonment 
NCS-Norwegian Continental Shelf 
NMD – Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
NORSOK – Norske Sokkel Standard 
OBM – Oil Based Mud 
PCH – Pressire Control Head 
PSA – Petroleum Safety Authority 
RLWI – Riseless Well Intervention 
ROT – Remote Operated Tool 
ROV – Remote Operated Vehicle 
Cost and Safety Efficient Plugging and Abandonment of Subsea Wells by a Smaller Vessel 
 
 
viii 
 
SCSSV – Subsurface Controlled Subsea Safety Valve 
SFT -  Surface Flow Tree 
SILS-Safety Integrity levels 
TFL - Methods 
TH – Tubing Hanger 
THRT – Tubing Hanger Running Tool 
TRT  - Tree Running Toll 
TTRD – Through Tubing Rotary Drilling 
UKCS – UK Continental Shelf 
UKOOA –UK Oil Operators Association   
ULP – Upper Lubricator Package  
ULP – Upper Lubricator Packahe 
UPIV – Upper Pressure In 
VXT – Vertical Christmas Tree 
WBE – Well Barrier Element 
WCP – Well Control Package 
WH -Wellhead 
WOI – Workover and Intervention 
WOICS – Workover and Intervention Control System 
XT-Christmas Tree 
 
 
 
 
 
Cost and Safety Efficient Plugging and Abandonment of Subsea Wells by a Smaller Vessel 
 
 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The decommissioning phase of offshore subsea oil field involves Plugging and Abandonment 
(P&A) program, where casing strings are and conductors are cut and recovery of the wellhead 
system is achieved. Regulatory bodies requires that the cutting of casing strings should be 
attempted 5 m below seabed (mud line) and zonal isolation be placed at various depth to 
permanently seal off and mitigate influx of reservoir fluids to migrated in the wellbore to the 
surface. This may have catastrophic consequences to the environment by polluting the water 
aquifer as well as affect sea inhabitants.  
 
Normally, operating company designs a P&A program based on the reservoir and wellbore 
data available and applies for consent to perform abandonment to the regulatory. Rules and 
regulations governs the wellbore abandonment where the primary responsibility is relies on 
the geographical location of the well. Further more considerations involving risks to future 
sealing capability failure should be made due to predicted build up of reservoir pressure (re-
pressurization)  and temperature (downhole changes) with time after abandonment.  
 
The system for well categorization have been discussed since it is necessary to assess the 
primary conditions of the shut in well to be permanent abandoned. The issue of SCP has been 
addressed by examining the source and means of controlling bleed off and treatment of non 
reservoir or reservoir fluids trapped in annuli spaces.  
 
It was necessary to account for state of the art of technology available today and evaluate cost 
and benefit related issues providing a safe and successful P&A program by utilizing a small 
intervention facilities contra drilling rig. This involved rules and regulation pertaining 
construction and use of small vessels for petroleum activities. The term small vessel is 
normally used in the oil industry frequently contradicting the fact that vessels are constructed 
with regard to flag state rules and regulations contra facilities governed by safety bodies 
regulating petroleum activities like NMD and PSA respectively.  The term WI/RLWI 
VESSELs will be met in this project work implying small facilities built fit for purpose for 
light and medium well intervention activities. 
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1.0 ESTABLISH NORMAL STATUS OF SHUT IN WELLS  
 
Well abandonment is a complex task that requires careful planning, risk evaluation and 
analysis with respect to safety issues and consent for abandonment program must be sought 
through to the legal authorities. The operators should adhere to the requirements and 
guidelines pertaining to the integrity of the well during plugging for permanent abandonment. 
The well status parameters are important to provide a framework for establishing satisfactory 
procedures for permanent abandonment where the objective is to permanently seal off and 
isolate the well forever. The principle parameters to achieve a successful sealing arrangement 
will depend mostly on data gathered from the completion of the well until the end of its 
producing life. In case of unsuccessful P&A, there are concerns to the environment liability 
and more critical is the cost risk for slick cleaning up and return for re-abandoning a leaky 
well.  (11)      
1.1  CATEGORIZATION SYSTEM 
 
In the North Sea, the UK sector, a categorisation system is developed to describe the status of 
suspended subsea shut in wells, particularly to exploration and appraisal wells. The system is 
described in paragraph 9 in the UKOOA (United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association) 
in which it is subjectively requiring a full review of the well with respect to risk assessment 
by taking into consideration the well status, proposed programme and ability to conform to 
legislation and operator’s policy. The categorization system is as emphasised in Table 1. (3) 
 
  Table 1. Commonly used categorization system. 
Category Definition 
1 The well has been sufficiently suspended that final abandonment only requires removal of the wellhead.  
2.1 
The well has one annulus uncemented.  
 
Placement of an additional permanent barrier is required to complete the 
abandonment of the well. This may be done by placing a barrier into the 
annulus or placing a separate barrier. 
 
This type of a well may be abandoned with a drilling rig or a light well 
intervention vessel. 
2.2 
The well has two annuli uncemented.  
 
Placement of an additional permanent barrier is required to complete the 
abandonment of the well. This may be done by placing a barrier into the 
annuli or placing a separate barrier. 
 
This type of a well may be abandoned with a drilling rig or a light well 
intervention vessel. 
3 
The suspended condition of the well is not suitable for full abandonment 
without significant intervention. 
 
Typically with current technology, the abandonment programme will 
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require a drilling rig to safely effect the operation. 
4 
Wells are placed in this category for several reasons: 
 The downhole status is not known, therefore can not be categorised 
 The well is in a condition where it is not possible to safely abandon 
with current technology 
  
The wells categorization as seen on Table 1 is based on the level of intervention required in 
order to achieve final abandonment. Whereby, the simplest wells requiring only wellhead 
removal are designated Category 1. Wells which require shallow plugs set in the casing and 
adjacent annuli are in Category 2. Wells requiring deeper intervention e.g. to set 
supplementary reservoir plugs are designated Category 3 and all wells where the scope of 
work is complex and unclear  due to uncertainties regarding suspension status are usually 
designated Category 4.  
 
Further more the categorization can be defined with respect to the well accessibility, as 
follows: 
 
  Table 2. Suspended wells categorization as defined by accessibility. 
Category Definition 
1 Accessible 
2 Not accessible because: 
2a On a template with other wells that are developed or planned for development 
2b Less than 50m from other subsea infrastructure 
2c Within 500m safety zone of an installation or subsea development 
2d The well has an identifiable problem where the risk associated with abandonment requires additional study 
2e Is deeply buried under seabed 
 
In the Norwegian sector, NCS , there is no special category of shut in wells, where the 
PSA/Ptil mostly refers to the Oil and Gas UK categorization system as described in table 1.  
 
Normally, it is required that the guidelines are incorporated into the planning of all new wells 
by ensuring that they can be classed as Category 1 wells after suspension of production 
(plugged and SCP control undertaken by the rig). This is from the perspective of minimising 
future abandonment costs. It has been observed that a large percentage of the currently 
suspended wells population does not meet this Cat 1 criterion. Wells of Category 2 &3 pose a 
challenge to be P&A by small mobile facilities due to the necessary perforating and 
cementing requirements that need to satisfy regulatory bodies (i.e. UK Oil & Gas guidelines, 
PSA, MMS and others). The synergy that negate the need to mobilize a rig undertake these 
challenges and constrains which is the main focus and theme of this work. 
 
 
1.2  WELL STATUS PARAMETERS 
 
In the oil and gas industry a well may be shut in and permanently abandonment as it may 
become inactive due to diminished economic return (at end reservoir life) or when wells 
drilled for exploration and appraisal (E&A wells) are found not economically viable to 
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produce. It is important to bear in mind that each well is unique and should be considered on 
an individual basis when considered for P&A permanently.   
 
The key parameter to the long term integrity of abandonment principally depends on the 
soundness of the initial well design and effectiveness of the primary casing cementations. 
Successful cementation behind casings during well completion will provide a beneficial 
barrier during the life of the well though not regarded as primary barriers.  
 
The UKOOA paragraph 4 and NORSOK Standard D-010 chapter 9.6 provide guidelines to 
what is required and considered to be the basic data/ information necessary to be gathered to 
establish the basis for well barrier design and abandonment programme: 
a)   Well configuration (original, intermediate and present) including depths and 
specification of permeable formations, casing strings, primary cement behind 
casing status, well bores, side-tracks, etc. 
b)  Stratigraphic sequence of each wellbore showing reservoir(s) and information 
about their current and future production potential, where reservoir fluids and 
pressures (initial, current and in an eternal perspective) are included. 
c)  Logs, data and information from primary cementing operations in the well. 
d) Estimated formation fracture gradient. 
e)  Specific well conditions such as scale build up, casing wear, collapsed casing, fill, 
or similar issues.    
It is recommended that uncertainties be taken into consideration during design of 
abandonment well barriers with respect to the following factors:  
  Downhole placement techniques. 
  Minimum volumes required to mix homogenous slurry. 
  Surface volume control. 
  Pump efficiency/ -parameters. 
  Contamination of fluids. 
  Shrinkage of cement or plugging material. 
 
1.3 LOAD CASES AND RISK ASSESSMENT  
 
During reservoir production, downhole condition changes such as pressure, thermal and total 
stress. These parameters will change drastically until the end of the reservoir production and 
the equilibrium at downhole condition will be reached several years after abandonment of the 
well. Thus necessitate taking into high consideration the estimation of pressure, thermal and 
stress changes that may develop in the reservoir after abandonment to prevent reduction of the 
plug sealing capacity due to plug failure as well as cement -rock de-bonding.  
 
The concern of reservoir re-pressurization after abandonment is very likely due to an active 
aquifer located beneath the reservoir. The reservoir re-pressurization prognosis is presumed to 
be achieved in over 130 years of abandonment and the thermal recovery approximately takes 
400 years. (9)  
 
In NORSOK Standard D-010 chapter 9.6.2, the load cases including functional and 
environmental loads are described as most unfavourable. Thereby for permanent 
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abandonment the specific gravity of the well fluid accounted for design is required to be equal 
to the sea water gradient. Similarly the risk assessment relating to the time effect on well 
barriers is considered with respect to reservoir pressure development and deterioration of 
material due to sour fluids as well as sagging of weight materials in the well fluids. 
 
1.4 LEAK POSSIBILITIES 
      
In risk assessment it is important to estimate the possibility of a reservoir fluid leakage to the 
environment, to any location above the mud-line, which had to be done for each well 
configuration depending on its attributes.  Identification of potential leak paths for each well 
should be inspected schematically with special emphasis for a leakage occurrence, in case one 
or more well barrier components should have failed by loosing the ability to contain the fluid 
within the well.   
 
The leakage possibility depends on intrinsic attributes specifically related to the 
wellbore/reservoir fluid type (oil/gas), fluid severity (sour/non-sour) and wellbore/reservoir 
energy (flowing/non-flowing). The consequence of a leak may be a threat to personnel and 
environment and that is reflected by extrinsic attributes (surroundings of the wellbore) related 
to environmental location and sort of installation within the area. (12)  
 
Reservoir 
Water 
bearing 
sand 
Figure1.  Typical category 2.1 suspension 
(UKOOA).  
Figure2.  Schematic well barrier leak paths 
PA well. 
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2.0 HANDLING POSSIBLY ENCOUNTERED TRAPPED HYDROCARBONS AND NON- 
RESERVOIR PRESSURE IN ANNULI SPACES. 
 
 
The occurrence of sustained casing pressure (SCP) is divided into two categories, where the 
first is pressure occurring only on production casing as a result of mechanical problems with 
the tubing string or other operationally induced pressure, and the other category is related to 
SCP occurring on all outer casing strings including structural and drive pipes. 
 
Primarily cementing between the casing strings provide support and prevent fluid movement 
through the annulus or into exposed permeable formations. During completion of the well, it 
is required that the cement slurry should effectively and efficiently displace drill cuttings and 
mud from the annulus and then solidify. The cement sheath formed should be able to 
withstand any future stress cycles that may be encountered during the whole life cycle of the 
well. Adequate design will influence a successful cementing job, that will include proper 
cement weight, composition, pre-job hole conditioning, and placement techniques. (18) 
 
2.1 SOURCE OF TRAPPED GAS AND HYDROCARBON LIQUIDS IN ANNULI SPACES  
 
It has been recognized by the petroleum industry that three possible factors most likely may 
contribute to a loss in annular pressure seal. The possible causes of SCP are as follows: 
i. Improper mud displacement previous to primary cementing 
ii. Gas influx as the cement transitions to a solid   
iii. Cement sheath stress cracking during the life of a well 
These three factors in addition to early and late onset mechanisms of primary cementing job 
contribute in a great extent SCP development between casing strings. There could be a 
problem in achieving a successful primary cement job during completion or during the 
wellbore’s productive life damages may arise due to excessive stress on the cement sheath 
leading to SCP and hence necessitate a costly remedial workover program. 
The slow pressure buildup in annuli may be caused by a long term gas leakage mechanism 
due to fracture development as a result of cement shrinkage when the radial stress is less than 
the static porous pressure. The gas will gradually flow by diffusion due to increase in contact 
area between gas bearing formations and cement sheath as the fracture height continues to 
grow. Gas diffusion becomes continuous with decreased pressures at or near the surface due 
to gas leak off. (18) 
 
2.1.1 IMPROPER MUD DISPLACEMENT 
 
Displacement efficiency is defined as the percentage of the annular volume filled with cement 
after pumping the cement slurry (Economides et al., 1998). Mud channeling must be avoided 
by all means during primary cementing job by proper mud displacement in the annulus. It is 
required to prevent mud channels or pockets that may cause pressure communication between 
zones or to the surface. It is necessary to take into consideration maintaining formation 
integrity when maximizing displacement efficiency. The mud displacement efficiency is 
influenced by the following factors as mostly agreed by (Mclean et al., 1967, Martin et al., 
1978, Beirute and Flumerfelt, 1977, and Haut and Crook, 1979): 
 Drilling mud conditioning 
  Pipe movement and centralization 
  Fluid velocity 
  Spacer and flush designs (including density differences) 
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These factors all contribute to proper mud displacement and ultimately to the success or 
failure of a primary cement job. (18) 
 
2.1.2  GAS MIGRATION THROUGH UNSET CEMENT 
 
API Cement slurries require different types of chemical additives to enhance or provide 
desired characteristics for a specific job. The cement additives available are grouped 
according to: 
  Density control 
 Setting time control 
 Lost circulation   
 Filtration control 
 Viscosity control, and  
 Special additives for unusual problems (Burgoyne et al., 1986).  
 
The problem of annular gas migration through unset cement is well known and a great deal of 
work has been done to identify causes and to provide solutions for mitigation of gas influx. 
During cement setting, gas can migrate through unset cement as it transits from fluid phase 
through the gel phase and hardens. Gas migration occurs when the overbalance pressure is 
lost due to the combined effects of static gel strength development and fluid loss (Carter and 
Slagle, 1972, Garcia and Clark, 1976 Levine et al., 1979 and Cooke et al., 1983). Gelation 
inhibits pressure transfer down through the setting column to make up for water volume 
reduction through permeable formations or from hydration. This is a point where gas can 
enter the setting cement and percolate to the surface leaving a permanent cement channel. 
 
2.1.3 CEMENT SHEATH FAILURE 
 
The primary cement sheath must set and develop sufficient compressive strength as soon as it 
is once placed, seal annular flow and support the casing previous to continuation of drilling 
activities. Pressure tests during well completion work for integrity, excessive casing pressure 
and temperature changes during the life of the well may contribute to cement sheath failure 
and further lead to annular pressure built up. Radial stress cracks may develop due to casing 
expansion caused by internal casing pressure after the cement has obtained high compressive 
strength. (18) 
 
2.2 SAFE METHODS FOR HANDLING TRAPPED GAS AND HYDROCARBONS UNDER 
PRESSURE IN ANNULI SPACES. 
 
PSA requires safe entry of live well and well control action procedures should be available to 
deal with the incidents that may lead to liability. In NORSOK Standard D-10, paragraph 9.5.1 
a table is provided to describe the scenarios requiring well control action procedures based on 
the planned activity.  Paragraph 9.7 requires HSE risk assessment relating to cutting of tubular 
goods, detection and releasing of trapped pressure and recovery of materials with unknown 
status. Therefore a risk analysis shall be performed and risk reducing measures should be 
applied to reduce the risk as low as reasonable practicable. Refer to table 3 with regard to 
incidents requiring well control package.   
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 Table3. Incident scenarios requiring well control actions.  
 
 
Bleed off options available for SCP are conventional bleed off system normal developed and 
applied in drilling rigs and the alternative bleed off system developed for containment and 
handling of SCP for small mobile facilities (WI-VESSEL). The following subchapters give 
detailed information and description of bleed off systems explanation as well as bleeding 
process of non-reservoir/reservoir contained casing pressure.     
  
2.2.1 CONVENTIONAL/ NORMAL SCP BLEED OFF SYSTEM APPLIED ON 
DRILLING RIGS. 
 
2.2.1.1  SCP DETECTION  
 
The first noticeable indication of SCP is a kick entering the wellbore after perforation of the 
casing string, which leads to the return of casing completion fluid with an initial peak pressure 
to the surface. The flow rate is readily noticeable at the surface under normal P&A conditions 
of a shut in well.  Eventually pressure 
decrease in the annulus is readily 
noticeable due to the loss of 
hydrostatic pressure in the annulus as 
the gas volume enters the wellbore 
(wellbore pressure increases). Over 
time, hydrostatic effects tend to 
dominate the whole system, and BHP 
increases significantly.   
The alternatives considered for 
stopping non-reservoir/reservoir fluid 
flow from the well is by closing a 
subsea blowout preventer (BOP) as in 
conventional well-control operations 
after the peak pressure is detected. 
When the BOP in figure 3 is closed, 
BHP starts to increase and the SCP 
from annulus flow decreases. It is 
important to know the allowed kick 
margin (total kick volume) not to 
exceed the riser burst strength for 
safety. The risk of exceeding the 
fracture pressure at the casing shoe is a 
relevant issue in any well-control 
situation, especially important for the 
narrow margins between pore and 
fracture pressure.      Figure 3. Drilling rig system 
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2.2.1.2 CSP CIRCULATION 
 
2.2.1.2.1 The diverter system. 
 
SCP can be controlled by a diverter which is hydraulically opened by high pressure migrating 
up the riser system. The diverter serves as dual purpose well control unit: It acts as a diverter 
while the upper hole is being drilled with a riser system in place as well as a annular blowout 
preventer after the conductor pipe has been cemented. During P&A operation the unit divertes 
SCP flow from the well by rerouting below drill floor through vent lines far from the rig. 
With the integral valve design, the piston movement hydraulically/pneumatically closes the 
upward flow path and opens the vent line for well fluid.  For simplicity its single control 
eliminates the need for external valves, actuators and interconnecting control circuits. Below 
is the description of the FSP diverter features where 
simplicity enhances safety (see figure 4): 
•  A vent line that is always open and clear. There are 
no valves to obstruct the vent line. 
• Elimination of stagnant vent line space. As a result, 
there is no caking of solids or formation of ice that 
could obstruct or shut off the flow. 
• An annular packing unit that closes on an open hole 
without use of an insert cartridge that can be 
overlooked or installed improperly. The packing 
unit also closes around drill pipe, kelly, casing and 
most tools. 
• Stripping capability. The FSP annular packing unit 
permits stripping of pipe into the hole while 
diverting well fluids. 
• A replaceable wear plate that eliminates metal-to-
metal contact between the packing unit inserts and 
the BOP head.   
• A bolted-in inner sleeve that eliminates the need for 
weld repair and is field-replaceable. (19) 
 
 
 
After the SCP has been detected and the volume flow can not be controlled by a diverter 
system, the BOP subsea may be closed by shutting in the well and bleed off SCP be 
controlled in the similar manner as a well kick through choke and kill lines.  The circulation 
of the completion fluid from the annuli with non-reservoir/ reservoir gas under high pressure 
will be lead through the choke lines from the BOP to the choke manifold and the pressure 
controlled through choke valves. The completion fluid/mud gas mixture will flow 
downstream to a mud/gas separator or de-gasser and gas bleed off and flared through a flaring 
system. Next page is the system description of the choke and kill line used on the 
conventional mobile drilling facility used to control a well kick.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Hydril diverter system (The 
FSP™ 28-2000 (Flow Safe 
Cost and Safety Efficient Plugging and Abandonment of Subsea Wells by a Smaller Vessel 
 
 
10 
 
2.2.1.2.2 The kill and choke circuits 
 
i) The kill line 
The system working pressure, pump liner size, maximum pump rate and pressure are clearly 
rated to the BOP pressure requirement. In any situation where the expected worst case kick 
conditions could not be handled, a high pressure kill line will be used. This arrangement is 
always on floating vessels and allows the well to be killed either by pumping under BOP’s 
through a non return valve or down the drill string through a circulating head. 
 
ii) The choke circuit 
All the equipments down stream of the chokes are rated at low pressure in contrast to 
upstream of the chokes which must have a working pressure rate at least equal to that of BOP 
stack. 
 
iii) Choke lines 
Choke lines are connected to the drilling spool in the BOP stack as seen in figure 5 by means 
of two valves in series where one of the valves is remote controlled so that the choke line can 
be opened rapidly in an emergency. It is required that two high pressure lines are fitted on 
floating vessels which can each act as a choke or kill line.  
The choke lines should be free of sharp bends and the use of small diameter choke lines is 
avoided since would consequently lead into high fluid velocities, significant erosion of the 
pipework and excessive pressure loss especially during the expansion of slugs of gas.  
Therefore it is very important that the diameter of the choke line should be as large as possible 
(3” or more).  
 
 
Figure 5. BOP choke and kill lines (21) 
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iv) Choke manifold 
 
The choke manifold is a series of lines, automatic valves, gauges, and chokes on the located 
on deck next to the drilling rig. It is connected to the BOP stack outlet by a choke line and 
direct flow from the well to the reserve pit, burning pit, mud tank. It can be used to relieve 
pressure buildup in a well after the BOP stack has been closed and to circulate heavier drilling 
mud. The choke manifold must be easily accessible. 
At least two adjustable chokes are fitted in the manifold to avoid the possibility that the choke 
system may be plugged and interrupt the controlled circulation after a kick. It is recommended 
that three adjustable chokes be fitted for manifolds with a working pressure greater than 5000 
psi (two manually controlled and one remotely controlled). Outlets with lower working 
pressure are provided downstream the chokes manifold to the de-gasser, flare, slush pit and 
mud tanks. 
A pressure gauge normally covering a pressure range up to the BOP working pressure and 
recorder are permanently installed on the manifold upstream of the chokes, to give a 
continuous reading of the surface pressure in the drill pipe/casing annulus. It is advisable to 
add a carefully calibrated low-pressure gauge (50-100 bar depending on Pin) in order to avoid 
breaking down the formation when the well is closed in after a kick.  A pressure gauge 
showing the drill pipe pressure should be located so that it can be read when standing at the 
choke manifold.  These two pressures (drill pipe and annulus) should also be displayed at the 
remote control station (2).  
  
2.2.1.2.3 The low pressure circuit 
 
i) De-gasser. 
 
The most commonly used type of de-gasser is the vertical separator with interior baffles. 
There is often a second de-gasser, downstream of this separator, which works in a closed 
circuit on the first active mud tank. The gas removed from the mud must be discharged 
outside the security zone or classified area (2).  
 
ii) Flare system 
 
Two flare lines are normally installed with horizontal flare booms and they are located as far 
as possible from the classified areas. 
 
iii) Mud tanks. 
 
The volume of the mud tanks must be sufficient to cope with the requirements of kick control 
(weighting the mud, squeezing, etc.). If possible the capacity of the tanks should be at least 
equal to the volume of the well when reservoir or other danger zones are penetrated.  
 
iv) Mud mixing equipment. 
 
A bulk mud mixing device should be installed capable of mixing 6 t/hr of weighting material 
(2). 
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2.2.2 ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGY APPLIED ON WI VESSEL HANDLING SCP. 
 
 
A controlled pressure relief system 
(CPRS) for handling  SCP has been 
developed by IOSS for P&A 
operations, where the bleeding off 
SCP is controlled by means of a choke 
manifold system on deck of a mobile 
facility. The requirements for the 
system include safe separation of gas 
from liquid and the relief/venting of 
the gas at a safe exit point as 
illustrated in figure 6. The CPRS shall 
as well have a minimum capability of 
handling 1.5 times the trapped volume 
of non-reservoir/reservoir pressure in 
subsea well control package (SSLIS) 
from the well (Typical volumes of 850-
900litres = Total capacity 
requirements +/- 
900*1.5=1350litres).  
(15) 
       Figure 6. MHT and vent lines for SCP 
 
2.2.2.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE OVERALL BLEED OFF SYSTEM  
 
The design of the CPRS comprises of the following equipments: 
 
i) Choke manifold  
 
 A simplified manifold system available to route returns from the umbilical to the 
choke and ventilation system. A minimum 690 bar working pressure is a requirement 
for lines and hoses between the umbilical and the choke manifold system, connections 
and valves on the high pressure side of the choke manifold.  
 A minimum 2 valves should be mounted in series in front of each choke.  
 The choke manifold shall as a minimum include 2 (two) chokes, a manual and 
automatic remote operated (auto choke). 
 In the case of manually operated chokes, the circulating pressure and the choke 
manifold pressure shall be displayed on or close to the manifold. All pressure 
indication gauges should be through hydraulic pressure de-boosters with remote 
output. 
 
The routing of the system vent-lines from the choke manifold is fitted up the top of the derrick 
structure, as seen on the picture above. The routine of the vent-lines from K&C lines is 
similar to that commonly used on drill rigs (15).  
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ii) Control system 
 
The auto operation is controlled via a touch screen LCP or from central control room via a 
data link. All measured process data are available on the LCP and data link. Manual operation 
is done directly on the manual choke and local instruments for pressure and temperature 
inside the manifold and flow in the vent line are located close to the manual choke. 
 
iii) Separation system (Mud Gas Separator) 
 
The mud gas separator (MGS) is a system provided to separate gas from liquid where it is 
located adjacent to the choke manifold. The system is designed and equipped with standard 
internal baffle system for flow separation of mud-gas mixture. The separated gas outlet is 
routed through the vent tower over sufficient height. The fluid outlet from MGS is via a pump 
sump that utilizes a liquid seal to prevent gas entering a transfer pump which loads the 
separated fluid into a portable tank. The pressure differential in the pump sump between the 
gas and fluid is used to control the outlet valve keeping liquid seal in the MGS constant (15.  
iv) Waste handling 
  
The waste is handled by a positive displacement pump (lobe pump) which is controlled by the 
level in the pump sump transferring the fluid to the portable tank. The pump sump is suitably 
built such that it acts as a buffer for high flow of fluid during bleeding off gas and fluid. The 
vent lines from the portable tank and pump sump are connected separately on the choke 
manifold system by quick connections and flexible hoses. 
 
 
Figure 7. Presentation of the main flows through the MGS system P&ID. 
v) Hose reel  
 
The hose reel station on the diagram, connects the choke system to the wellhead with a high 
pressure hose and the station is hydraulically operated by the facility HPU. The hose is 
provided with an isolation valve enabling storage of the hose fully pressurised and a quick 
connection for ROV operation. The hose reel directs the gas and fluid to the MGS through the 
choke system (15).    
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3.0  ESTABLISH OVERALL PROCEDURE FOR ENTIRE OPERATION SEEN FROM THE WELL 
ASPECT. 
 
Government bodies, like PSA in Norway, provide guidelines and regulate wellbore P&A with 
primary responsibility depending on the location of the well. Regulatory guidelines govern the 
P&A operational procedures where former producing horizons are plugged and casing is cut 
off below the mudline, requirement of at least two, and mostly often three, zone isolating 
plugs. Lastly, thorough procedures and verification for testing set plugs are outlined according 
to guidelines (4, chapter 4.7.2 and chapter 9) 
 
3.1 PLANNING AND REGULATORY CONSENT FOR P&A PROGRAMME FOR SUBSEA WELLS. 
 
In the federal Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM), the Minerals 
Management Service (MMS) is the lead agency that provides regulations, guidelines and 
general applications to all wells and specifies the minimum requirements to P&A. The 
operator is required to submit form MMS-124, ‘Application for Permit to Modify (APM)’, 
and receive approval for the operation. Form MMS-124 contains information on the reason 
the well is being plugged, a work requirements description, an assessment of the expected 
environmental impacts of the operation, and the procedures and mitigation measures 
necessary to minimise such impacts (Federal Register, 2002). It requires that before 
operations commences, the MMS District Supervisor should be notified at least 48 hr prior to 
the operation.  
 
In the NCS, the Petroleum Act Re Section 22 on Decommissioning plan states that: The 
Norwegian Pollution Control Authority shall be notified of decommissioning of petroleum 
activities, cf. the pollution Act Section 20. If the decommissioning plan in accordance with the 
Petroleum Act is not sufficient in relation to requirements given in or pursuant to the 
pollution Act, the Pollution Control Authority may demand further information and 
investigations to be performed to map the risk of pollution in connection with and after 
decommissioning of petroleum activities, cf. the pollution Act Sections 49 and 51. In addition, 
the Pollution Control Authority may stipulate what measures are necessary to counteract 
pollution, cf. the pollution Act Section 20 second paragraph. 
 
Guidelines Interpretations on Section 22 Decommissioning plan states that: 
The plan that the licensee is required to prepare according to the Petroleum Act Section 5-1 
shall be submitted to the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Inclusion with a copy to the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate and the Petroleum 
Safety Authority. In addition to documentation as mentioned in Regulations 27 June 1997 
No.653 to Act relating to petroleum activities Section 44, the plan shall contain a description 
of the following: 
a)   risk during and following a possible removal, 
b)   methods intended to be used in the event of a possible removal, including 
refloating of the structure, 
c)   analyses planned to be carried out, 
d)   operations planned to be carried out in the event of a possible removal, 
e)   consequences of a possible removal in respect of adjacent fields and facilities, 
f)   other matters of importance to a prudent conduct, 
g)   measures, if any, designed to secure the area against possible future pollution 
from abandoned wells and/or polluted deposits of cuttings. 
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The P&A plan of the well should entail the procedure based on the reservoir and wellbore 
condition including a review of the existing wellbore design along with records of past 
intervention work, well performance and geologic conditions, age of the well that influences 
hardware deterioration. Further the operator shall investigate all items related to health and 
safety issues by taking into consideration regulatory requirements. The operator will design a 
P&A programme for a specific well and will apply for regulatory approval. The P&A 
operation of a well shall as well include the contract type, site location, job specification, 
water depth and the occurrence of exogenous events, such as weather and problem wells. 
Factors such as wellbore complexity, job preparation and contractor experience are 
unobservable and may influence the time and cost of the operation. The operator must include 
in a comprehensive plan contingency responses to difficulties that may be encountered during 
the operation (22).  
 
3.2 PLUG SETTING 
 
A plan for plug setting and conditions at the time of the activity will determine the success of 
the operation. As previously discussed, it is necessary to consider each well differently since 
each well is unique due to the basic data available. The number of barriers for isolation of 
distinct permeable zones and from surface or seabed should be as described in the UKOOA 
guideline requirements in paragraph 3. The guidelines provide required standards for 
abandonment as discussed in detail in paragraph 5 taking into consideration §5.1 acceptable 
permanent barriers material and §5.2 location from surface. NORSOK Standard D-010 
paragraph 9 requires that there should be at least one well barrier between surface and a 
potential source of inflow, and two well barriers unless it is a reservoir (contains HC and/ or 
has a flow potential) as seen on attachment 3 (NORSOK Standard §9). 
 
Preferably it would be of great advantage to discuss the plugging procedures with respect to 
well categorization.  The objective and limitation of this thesis will basically focus in P&A of 
subsea shut in wells Categories 1 to 3.   
 
Each case of well P&A category is handled separately taking into consideration the status of 
the well. Three thorough flow diagrams have been developed to establish complex issues to 
be accounted for before conducting P&A process. The guidelines and flexibility in the 
application of regulations set by regulatory authorities defers in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM), 
North Sea UK side and Norway. The guidelines provided in the NORSOK Standard D-010r3 
are generally used for P&A in the NCS. PSA is responsible for supervision of the 
decommissioning activities and recommend the application of the UK Oil and Gas guidelines 
(UKOOA) for P&A as well as ensure that the well permanent seal integrity is assessed to 
prevent pollution after abandonment. In NORSOK Standard D-010r3, the minimum 
requirements for permanent barriers are not specified in contrast to the UKOOA guidelines 
where the locations and height of cement plugs (barriers) are specified (paragraph 5 Required 
Standards for Abandonment section 5.1-3).  The guidelines in NORSOK D-010, paragraph 9 
recommend that the minimum position of the well barrier be designed for integrity such that 
the secondary barrier shall be placed at a depth where the estimated formation fracture 
pressure exceeds the contained pressure below the well barrier. In the GOM, well plugging 
procedures usually require a minimum of three cement plugs, though the exact number of 
plugs varies with the downhole conditions of the wellbore and the number of production 
zones. It is as well required that the cement quality must meet the approval of the MMS 
District Supervisor. Most cement plugs are 100 - 200ft (30 - 60m) in length to provide a seal 
against the vertical migration of fluid or gas. 
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It is required that all portions of the well that are not plugged with cement should be filled 
with fluid to control the possible influx of formation fluids into the wellbore in the intervals 
between plugs. It is necessary that the fluid should have the proper density to exert hydrostatic 
pressure exceeding formation pressure in the intervals between plugs during abandonment. 
The use of reconditioned drilling mud or completion fluid is allowed and most cases the fluid 
can be mixed on-site (22). 
 
3.3 FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED WHEN PLANNING A SAFETY EFFICIENT P&A PROGRAM 
FOR SUBSEA WELLS. 
 
Prior to establishing a P&A program, it is necessary to outline factors to be prevailed over for 
a successful permanent abandonment of the well especially considering that the process will 
be performed by a small mobile intervention facility. The conventional P&A operations by 
the use of drilling rigs are well known and technically proven to be very successful despite of 
the underlying high costs of rig charges. The new approach of conducting P&A operation by a 
small facility with the main focus in cost reduction (cost efficient) without jeopardizing the 
environment and safety, will require a very thorough planning and careful consideration of all 
aspects of constrains that may have an impact in HSE issues.    
 
Principally, the well status determines the scope of work to be done and the technicalities 
required to permanently achieve a successful abandonment of the well. The small internal 
diameter of well control package applicable for light & medium well intervention governs 
deployment methods and size of toolstring (length and diameter).The technology available to 
a new approach in well P&A necessitate treatment of each well category individually. Flow 
diagrams have been developed as seen in figure 8 highlighting the complexity of P&A 
operation for each category and stepwise technical approaches of achieving well bore 
isolation.   
  
 
 
Figure 8. Hierarchy approach of highlighting shut in well state and P&A procedures. 
 
3.3.1 P&A PROGRAM FOR SHUT IN WELL CATEGORY 1: RIG CHASE (WH PICK; 
30”+20”) 
 
Regulatory bodies require operators to prepare wells not economicaly viable to produce at end 
of producing life to a level of Category 1, where the preliminary abandonment procedures 
have been completed by the drilling rig (recovered production tubing, plugs set, perforated 
casings and bleed off SCP/ reservoir fluids under pressure that may be found between casing 
strings/annuli spaces).  
Well Category 
CAT 1 CAT 2 CAT 3 
Well 
Status 
P&A 
Program 
Well 
Status 
Well 
Status 
P&A 
Program 
P&A 
Program 
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The P&A program will only require WH recovery where today it is done by a MPSV, 
severance of casing strings performed by utilizing water jet cutting (IMCT) and lifting of the 
WH by a WH Pick up tool (Norse Cutting & Abandonment- NCA). According to the 
interview with Mr. Per Lund of NCA conducted on 6th March 2009 at 1300hrs, the procedure 
of wellhead cutting (Rig Chase Method), seen in figure 9, is performed without the use of 
risers since the well has been secured by plugs and any traces of SCP in the casings annuli 
spaces have been bled off by a drilling rig.  Rig Chase Method means releasing (chasing) the 
rig to move to a new location while DP MSV conducts the WH removal campaign saving 
60% of abandonment costs and three to six hours of rig spread time useful for drilling 
activities. The rig chase method has superior cutting speed ranging from 1-2hrs and the 6 -10 
hrs deployment roundtrip deck-subsea-deck.      
Other reasons of securing a shut in well in category 1 state: 
 Temporary abandoned well with the possibility of re-entry and later the decision is 
made by the operator to permanently isolate and abandon the well. 
 Slim well with no possibility of deploying cutting tools for severing the casing strings. 
Obviously slim wells have small dimensions on downhole equipments requiring the 
use of wire line deployed tool.  
    
Figure 9. Category 1 well status and WH recovery procedures. 
 
3.3.1.1  THE RIG CHASE METHOD IS CONDUCTED AS FOLLOWS (NCA): 
 
WELL CATEGORY 1
State of the well P&A Program 
Reservoirs zones 
Isolated 
Tubing severed and 
Recovered by Rig 
Cement Plugs Set 
as Required 
SCP Control by 
Drilling Rig 
X-tree recovered 
and surface cement 
plug set below WH 
Corrosion cap 
fitted on WH 
Dead well 
Requirement 
Barrier on Well 
Entry
NO
GENERAL 
SAFETY (HSE) 
Program for 
WH Recovery  
REQUIRED 
 WH Removal 
Recover 
Corrosion Plug  
(WH Plug) 
Technology 
WH Pick & 
IMCT
Cut Casing 
strings by 
IMCT
WH Recovery 
by WH Pick 
REQUIREMENT 
(PSA, MMS, 
ACTS etc) 
5 m below ML
GUIDELINES 
(NORSOK Standard/ UKOOA) 
- Cement Plug Height 100-200ft 
- Plug Test Requirement (Done by rig)
Conventional 
Casing strings 
Severance by 
Explosives
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1. Rig up on deck the Subsea Wellhead Picker (WHP) equipped with an Internal Multi-
string Cutting Tool (IMCT). 
2. Deploy the WHP with heave compensated crane over the side of a vessel or run 
through moon pool of the vessel by a module-handling tower. 
3. The IMCT is stabbed (ROV assisted) into the inner casing and lowered to cutting 
depth typically 15ft (5M) below mudline as required PSA/Ptil. Thereafter the WHP 
connector is lowered and latched onto the Wellhead.   
4. Conduct a pull test to verify integrity. 
5. Perform multi-string cutting by severing all the layers by abrasive water jet cutting in 
one attempt. 
6. Recover wellhead and conductor once cutting is completed.     
     
3.3.1.2  SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND OPERATION 
 
The IMCT is equipped with packers, air supply, and return lines, where once the packers are 
set and engaged, then pressured air displaces water below the cut line. The atmosphere 
created is coupled with the abrasive slurry system which contributes to severing of the multi-
string. The heave compensation system will determine the operation window such that it can 
be carried out with a significant 
wave height, Hs ≤ 3m.    (Offshore 
magazine - World Trends and 
Technology for Offshore Oil and 
Gas Operations/ (10).  
 
Most WH recovery activities by the 
use of DP MSV are conducted in the 
North Sea, UK offshore side, with 
long offshore history and old fields. 
This method of WH recovery is not 
fully commercialised in the NCS 
since most of the subsea fields are 
still producing (10).   
 
  
       Figure 10. Severed casing-strings and WH pick up. 
 
 
3.3.2 P&A PROGRAM FOR SHUT IN WELL CATEGORY 2  
 
The status of the well may have one or two uncemented annuli where the well has been killed 
and reservoir isolation plugs set. The state of the well at this stage requires placement of 
additional permanent barrier (shallow plugs be set in casing and adjacent annuli) for complete 
abandonment. Thus the well necessitates a safety efficient re-entry and deployment of plugs 
by wireline conveyed tool string through a SILS and WCP. The SILS is deployed from the 
intervention vessel through moon-pool by a (MHT) lowering the well control package by 
guiding through guide-wires and relocates into XT.   
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3.3.2.1  CATEGORY 2 WELL STATUS, REGULATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY 
LIMITATION 
 
The evaluation approach of the state condition of the well after shut in is as illustrated in 
figure 11 accounting for all major constrains and by disregarding other problems related to 
material degrading and well bore geometry. Regulations and guidelines provide necessary 
information on how the operation should be handled, therefore it is best to look into and be 
careful to ascertain the technical complexity of the task and associated risks. Further it is of 
great importance to look especially at the technology available with regard to WI/RLWI 
VESSELs to achieve a safe and successful P&A end product.       
 
 
Figure 11 hierarchy approach of highlighting initial condition for shut in well category 2. 
 
3.3.2.2  GENERAL PROCEDURE FOR P&A OF SHUT IN WELL CATEGORY 2. 
 
The scope of work for P&A is emphasized by examining the elements brought about from the 
technical evaluation of primary state condition of the well as illustrated in the figure above. 
Normally, oil operating companies provide the decommissioning plan of a field consisting of 
P&A program of each individual well.   
 
Reservoir Zones 
Isolated 
Tubing Severed and 
Recovered by Rig 
WELL CATEGORY 2
State of the Well P&A Program 
1 Annulus 
Uncemented 
Corrosion Cap 
on WH
2 Annuli 
Uncemented 
Production Casing 
Plug Set (9 5/8”) 
SCP Management
(Done by Rig)
Annulus Cement Plug 
(9 5/8”- 13 3/8”) Set & 
Tested as Required by 
Regulations 
Surface/Top Cement 
Plug Required (Option)
Casing Strings 
Severence and WH 
Recovery is Required
 Bleed Off  
 Circulation 
System
Several Barriers/ 
Plug Required
Perforation for SCP 
Bleed off 
Cement Plug 
Setting & Testing 
Requirement 
Technology 
 WOICS & SILS Package 
 Small Bore Rigged Riser System for CT 
Dead Well 
Regulation 
Well Control 
System
YES NO
Guidelines 
(e.g. NORSOK standard, UKOOA)  
Regulations  
(e.g.PSA, Pretroleum Act, HSE) 
Cement Plug Not Set  
(13 3/8”- 20”) 
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RLWI / WI VESSELs perform intervention operation by deploying tools and equipments by 
wireline and CT respectively through subsea well control packages with limited bore diameter 
(small). That gives a design basis for the type and size of plugs that will be set downhole, 
perforation interval, and the means of taking returns (circulation) during cleaning and cement 
plug setting operations. The status of the well evaluated in figure 12 will provide enough 
information to ascertain the number of plugs to be deployed and location/ interval for plug 
setting with respect to rules, regulation and guidelines.  Regulatory bodies as well strictly 
require establishment of barriers prior to entry of the well susceptible of containing non 
reservoir/ reservoir fluids under pressure between the casing strings.  Under P&A well 
category 2 it is necessary to be certainly sure of the control of SCP on whether it has been 
done by a drilling rig. 
 
 
Figure 12. P&A program for P&A well category 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
CAT 2.1 
1 Annulus 
uncemented 
P&A Well CAT 2 
Requirement 
2 Barrier 
Elements
Set Mechanical 
Bridge Plug  
13 3/8''
SAFETY 
Perforate Casing  
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Control SCP and 
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Set Mechanical 
Bridge Plug 
9 5/8'' 
Perforate Casing 
9 5/8'' 
CAT 2.2 
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uncemented 
Requirement  
Well Entry 
(Barrier Elements) 
Technology 
 Wireline -WOICS 
& SLIS 
 CT & Riser 
 Bleed off & Cement 
Circulations System 
 WH Pick & IMCT 
Set Cement Plug 
9 5/8'' - 13 3/8'' 
P&A CAT 2.1  
Guidelines  
-100ft 
-500ft
Guidelines  
Plug Test 
Requirement
Set Cement Plug 
in Annulus  
13 3/8''-20'' 
Set Top Plug 
20”-30” 
WH Corrosion 
Cap Recovery 
Guidelines  
5m below Mud 
Line 
Regulations 
(PSA, MMS, HSE etc)  
& Guidelines 
(NORSOK, UKOOA etc.)  
Casing Strings 
Severance & 
WH Recovery 
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3.3.2.3  CASING PERFORATION AND SETTING OF CEMENT PLUG 
 
Wireline is used to set a mechanical bridge plug and deployment of a cross over tool assembly 
comprising of double packers system, circulation valves and a set of explosive charges. 
Casing perforation is necessary to establish:   
i) Access to the annulus for checking and bleed off any SCP and flush of reservoir fluid 
that may be found in annuli. 
ii) Circulation path for setting cement plug by pumping and circulating cement and 
displacement of completion fluid present in the annuli.  
 
The volume of circulated return can be calculated prior to the operation to account for storage 
consideration made with respect to the capability of separation system. It is important to 
consider the means to handle HC since it is not allowed to discharge any effluent at sea.  In a 
small vessel one should think of the tank volume available for storage of the return. 
 The formula is given as: ffcpccr VHAAV  )( 12  
 Where,  rV = volume of return  
2cA = casing string 
1cA = tubing/casing 
cpH = height of cement plug 
ffV = flash fluid (brine, mud etc.) 
 
Deployment procedure for BHA and cement setting. 
1. Pull corrosion cap on WH. Re-enter the well.  
2. Set bridge plugs by wireline below WH as required 
3. Deploy BHA for casing perforation and circulation  
4. Perforate casing and check for SCP and hydrocarbons. 
5. Pump and circulate cement to set intermediate plug above bridge plug as required. 
6. Leave cement plug to set in the annulus.  
7. POOH BHA 
8. Test cement plug as required. 
9. Severe casing strings by IMCT  
10. Recover WH and severed casing strings by WH pick. 
      
Circulation of fluids and cement slurry is made possible through two umbilical lines (hoses) 
connected to the crossover tool in the figure below. Latching operation of the tool on the WH 
is carried out by ROV in open water. Part of the tool assembly may remain with the set 
cement plug forming a permanent barrier. The design basis of the umbilicals system for the 
BHA will be dimensioned to handle a kick expected from SCP. The advantage with this 
system is that it can be used for deeper waters compared to CT riser system limited depth of 
600m to seabed. After the barrier element have been established, casing-strings cutting may 
be performed and recovery of the WH.  
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 Figure 13.  Deployment of BHA for P&A                           Figure 14. Alternative solution for BHA 
 
3.3.2.4  ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION OF CT DEPLOYED BHA 
 
This type of make up tool should be assembled with various sizes of packers depending on the 
space between casing strings during P&A operation and it should allow a small part of the 
BHA to remain in place above the set cement plug sheath.  The make up length of the tool 
would vary from 100ft up to 500ft depending on the acceptable height of cement plug 
required. The tool string design should be simple such that the make up connections will 
comprise of fewer component parts. Circulation of cement in CT is possible since the return 
would make its way up through the riser system. Base on the discussion above, I have come 
14. The bottom packer may be left in place as part of a permanent plug. This alternative 
would require first a set of perforation guns be deployed by wireline in one run, oriented and 
set on appropriate intervals and perforation conducted to establish access to the space between 
the casing strings. The gun may be dropped down and left in the wellbore. 
 
3.3.2.5  DESIGN OF AN INTERFACE ADAPTER BETWEEN WCP AND WH. 
 
Entry of a shut in well category 2 will require establishment of a well control barrier, since 
after corrosion cap is set on WH, pressure in the well might have build up over time 
depending on the primary cement job and if any SCP leak off path were discovered during 
temporary abandonment and not properly sealed (CSP controlled by drill rig). The WCP for 
wireline and CT (light & medium) designed fit for purpose for intervention activities on 
subsea well have small diameter adapter suitable for connection into XT stack. Therefore 
there is a need to design an adapter/interface connection for connect/nipple down the WCP to 
the WH; otherwise there would be a need to re-run and nipple down the XT on the WH as a 
connection between the WH and WCP. Taking as an example the neck for an H-4 WH (18¾”) 
is approximately 22-23”OD and the WCP is designed with an adapter of 13 5/8”, definitely an 
interface adapter will be required provide connection of the two systems.    
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3.3.3 ESTABLISHMENT OF INITIAL CONDITION FOR SHUT IN WELL CATEGORY 3. 
 
P&A program requires a clear understanding of all possible situations that may be 
encountered in the well, such that an evaluation of all appropriate technical solutions could be 
put forward for achieving a successful end product. So far the regulatory authorities require 
safe P&A operation for shut in well Cat 3 be conducted by drilling rigs (conventional). The 
oil industry needs IOR of subsea well by effectively reducing costs that includes the use of 
technical solutions available on fit for purpose intervention vessels without violating safety 
issues and cause damage to the environment. Obviously it is necessary to convince the 
authorities that the technology available today on small intervention facilities will 
successfully provide the same end result in P&A operations as done by a drilling rig. To 
overcome constrains or challenges posed by this operation on shut in well category 3, a 
careful examination of what necessary would affect HSE issues has be conducted without 
disregarding the regulations and guidelines laid down by regulatory bodies and by local and 
international standards respectively. The shut in well category 3 is described in Table 1 
chapter 1 and further a detailed evaluation of the state of the well is carried out as illustrated 
in figure 15. The emphasis on the flow diagram describes the technology dependence to meet 
the requirements set by regulatory bodies and standard with focus on a safe and cost efficient 
P&A operation of shut in well category 3.   
1  
Figure 15. Hierarchy approach highlighting initial condition for shut in well category 3. 
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3.3.3.1 P&A PROGRAM FOR SHUT IN WELL CAT 3. 
 
The P&A program is based on shut in well pre-condition, technology available for conducting 
the operation safely and successfully as well as satisfaction of rules, regulations and 
guidelines. As seen from well intervention perspective, most of the operations are conducted 
through XT bore, and the WCP dimension (length and internal diameter) further gives 
limitation to the dimension for necessary BHA to be deployed in the well.  
  
3.3.3.2 KILL THE WELL AND ESTABLISHMENT OF WBES.  
 
Primary for a live shut in well category 3, a kill pill will be required and squeezed into the 
reservoir formation to block flow of the reservoir fluids into the wellbore.  
Kill weight calculations: 
Kill weight to RT (brine):  
         sgbarttRTTVDmd barsbarpw f ffbkill 1000
)(647.0
,0981.0
)( 12max 
   
The kill hose margin:  
   
     sgmdRTTVDmd
dSWmdsgw
w
WHRTf
WHRTsgWHRTkill
mkill




,,
 
Therefore;                   Kill weight = Kill weight to RT (brine) +The kill hose margin 
  
Where; killw = kill weight to top of reservoir formation 
 fbpmax = maximum formation pressure at top of perforation  bar  
 fs - safety factor for overbalance  bar  
 fd = depth to top of existing perforation  RTTVDm ,  
0981.0 =specific gravity  sg  
 1000)(647.0 12 tt  = correction factor for thermal expansion of brine  bar  
 mkillw , = kill weight for hose margin  sg  
 WHRTd  = height RT to WH  m  
 sgSW = sea water specific gravity sg  
 WHSWd  = SW depth to WH  m  (15) 
 
Thereby the kill pile would be followed by bullheading and squeeze cement into the 
formation to prevent any leakage or influx of HC into the wellbore thus creating a primary 
well barrier. Setting of a mechanical plug is an alternative solution (option) instead of 
bullheading and squeezing cement into formation in a dead well. Technical solutions for 
bullheading cement slurry and mechanical plug setting are as follows: 
 Wireline operation of P&A. 
  Cement slurry bullheading is achieved by pumping through production tubing via 
umbilical kill lines or production hub without taking the return.   
  Mechanical plug set by wireline. 
 CT operation 
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  Cement slurry bullheading is achieved by pumping through CT and possible 
return may find way up through a small bore riser system. 
  Mechanical plug set by CT. 
 
Secondary well barrier for P&A will be set as illustrated in figure 16 where the live well is 
plugged and cemented until is brought to category 1. At this stage it is safe to enter the well 
through open water and the campaign for WH recovery is performed.   
 
 
 
Figure 16. P&A for shut in well category 3 
 
3.3.3.3 RECOVERY OF TH AND XT 
 
Normally TH and the production tubing are recovered through the riser system when PA is 
carried out by a drill rig. Drilling BOPs and riser systems for WO and recompletion work are 
designed with full bore to accommodate and run the TH. The recovery of TH by a small 
intervention facility poses a challenge since it has to be lifted up in open water and 
consideration should be made as well to account for the sitting location of TH. The type of 
XT on the well came into focus since it provides necessary information on the scope of the 
job to be done prior to recovery of the TH as seen in figure 17. The TH is located on the WH 
under XT in a completed well with a VXT in contrary to HXT completed well where the TH 
sits in the XT. The later allows the TH to be removed from the WH without recovering first 
the XT. 
Thus simplifying perforation and setting of top cement plug.  
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Figure 17. P&A procedures for shut in well category 3 
 
It is expected that annulus A is always filled with non corrosive packer fluid which prevent 
corrosion on the casing and tubing. Annulus B is filled with completion fluid like OBM, and 
it is expected that most of heavier compounds (weighting agent) in the mud will settle down 
after time living a light medium above it.   
The following is the procedure for setting mechanical bridge – and cement plugs in the 
wellbore including illustration of the process involved figure 18 to 20 : 
1. Bullhead and squeeze cement into reservoir perforation. For a dead well a 
mechanical packer could be set over the production zone in the 7”” production 
tubing and cement plug set over it. 
2. Test cement plug according to provided guidelines and requirements (pressure or 
weight tested). 
3. Set bridge plugs in the production tubing across production packer. 
4. Perforate tubing above bridge plug to establish access to annulus A (7''-9 5/8'') and 
control SCP. 
5. Set cement plug in annulus A. Circulate of the annulus fluid will be through 
annulus access valve. 
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Figure 18. P&A procedure, steps 1 to 5 for Vertical and Horizontal XT.  
 
6. Severe/cut production tubing below SCSSV. This can be done by tractor with a 
cutter tool deployed by e-line.   
7. Circulate brine/ sea water to clean the tubing by flushing. Consideration on oil 
water separator capacity (philosophy of zero discharge to sea) and storage. 
8. The TH is recovered through open water. In a well with VXT, the tree will be 
recovered first and the TH underneath recovered to surface. In the case of HXT, 
TH will be removed easily since it is accommodated in the tree itself and followed 
by retrieval of the XT.  
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Figure 19. P&A procedure, steps 6 to 8 for Vertical and Horizontal XT.  
 
 
9. Set bridge plug in 9 5/8'', perforate to access annulus B (9 5/8''-13 3/8'') and 
control SCP. 
10. Set cement plug and test for integrity. 
11. Perforate intermediate 13 3/8” casing and set top cement plug between 13 3/8” - 
20” casing 
12. Low down IMCT and latch the WH Pick, severe casing strings and recover with 
the WH.  
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Figure 20. P&A procedure, steps 9 to 12 for Vertical and Horizontal XT.  
 
3.4 TH AND PRODUCTION TUBING CLEANING 
 
P&A operation by use of small facilities requires removal of TH in open water, discussed 
early, exposing the wellbore to the open sea as well. Thus to avoid HC spill to the sea, it 
would be necessary to clean the TH while still in the well. Normally this is not a problem 
when a drilling rig is used for P&A operation where the full bore of the riser allows TH to 
pass through it. The flushing fluid is required to have sufficient physical characteristics to 
remove unwanted material from the wellbore. 
In case sea water was used for the flushing operation as a flushing fluid, it has to be treated 
onboard before discharge to sea. Normally at sea oil water separators are used to separate oil 
and water mixture. For the case where brine is used for flushing operation, a means for 
recycling and recovery of brine should be arranged. The HC separated will be flared or 
transferred into storage tanks. A process system including flare as a possible means for 
handling upstream flushing water contaminated with HC during CT operations is discussed in 
subchapter 5.6.1.1.  
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3.5 WIRELINE SET PLUG AND PACKER 
 
Oil equipment suppliers like Schlumberger have developed expandable plugs that can be 
deployed by wireline through tubing. This eliminates dependence on the use of workover rig 
to perform P&A operations.  Expandle plug like PosiSet anchored elastomeric plug provides a 
seal which is similar to that achieved by cast iron plugs. The Casing Packer Setting Tool 
(CPST) provides a reliable method of deploying plugs and packers in the wellbore during 
completion, isolation, or abandonment, where a downhole electric motor within the 
mechanical plug-back tool (MPBT) Setting Unit (MPSU), is used to contract the elastomer 
sealing assembly to form a firm seal against the casing wall.  The plugs have an expansion 
ratio of 3:1 as see attachment 4. The anchor system on the plug acts as slips by providing 
satisfactory grippe against the inner walls of the casing keeping in the plug in place while 
cementing is placed on top at a height above 3m.  The smallest plug can withstand 25,000-lbf 
[111,205-N] and the largest (95.8-in. [24.45-cm]) plug can withstand 90,000-lbf [400,340-N] 
force (23).  
 
3.6 CEMENTING  
 
It is required that the material used as well barriers for P&A should withstand the 
load/environmental conditions they are exposed to for as long the well is abandoned. Long 
term integrity of the plug material will be performed by weighting or pressure (NORSOK 
standard chapter 9, and UKOOA guidelines paragraph 5.4).  Detailed information of cement 
required properties to provide desired characteristics for a specific operation are discussion in 
chapter 2.  The design of abandonment well barriers consisting of cement should account for 
uncertainties relating to: 
•  downhole placement techniques, 
•  minimum volumes required to mix a 
homogenous slurry, 
•  surface volume control, 
•  pump efficiency/ -parameters, 
•  contamination of fluids, 
•  shrinkage of cement. (NORSOK 
standard D10 rev 3) 
 
3.7 REMOVAL OF DOWN-HOLE AND SUBSEA EQUIPMENT 
 
The are no requirements for removal of downhole equipments provided that proper isolation 
of the well is achieved. Part of the completion may be left in place, but cables and control 
lines which are regarded as potential source of forming inflow paths should be removed and 
they are not considered to form part of permanent barriers (UKOOA paragraph 3.3). 
 
Consideration should be made to other users of the sea, therefore subsea equipments must be 
removed to avoid hazard situation. Common practise is to remove the WH and casing strings 
down to 5m below seabed. The requirement is provided to account for fishing activities in 
area where wells have been permanently abandoned.  Revision of the recommended depth for 
cutting subsurface and subsea equipment is important and it is required to be done 
individually on a case-by-case bases for each well with respect to prevailing local condition 
like sand waves,  soil, sea bed scouring and sea current erosion. In case of a concrete 
foundation on seabed, it is required that no casing string should protrude causing obstruction 
above such a structure.    (UKOOA guidelines & NORSOK standard D10 rev 3)  
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4.0 GENERAL ABOUT THE SET OF REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES FOR CONSTRUCTION OF 
VESSELS AND MOBILE FACILITIES 
 
Since the thesis work has more focus on offshore petroleum activities, there will be less focus 
on the details and information regarding rules applicable for service vessels registration with 
respect to that of a facility which must be fulfilled to meet the requirement for its registration. 
It is important to differentiate between a “standard” vessel as AHTS and a fit for purpose 
intervention vessel as RLWI. 
 
4.1 VESSELS 
 
Generally a vessel is built according to the rules set by the Flag State, where in Norway the 
rules are available in the Green Book published by the Norwegian Maritime Directorate 
(NMD) and as well it should fulfill the classification requirements imposed by classification 
society like Det Norske Veritas (DNV). This implies that a vessel certification will have to 
comply with only few requirements and regulations compared to a facility which in addition 
should comply fully with PSA regulations. It is observed that the regulations in the Working 
Environment Act can partly or fully be applied on a vessel and it is required that for a vessel 
to operate in the NCS, it shall also be subject to the Law of Seaworthiness, where this rule is 
not exceptional as well as for mobile offshore units. In paragraph § 1 it is stated that; 
“Norwegian vessels with 50 registered gross tonnage and more shall be subject to a control 
according to this law. The control includes every single aspect which assumes or can 
influence the vessel’s seaworthiness”. 
Offshore mobile units’ construction is governed by guidelines and regulations set by the 
Norwegian Petroleum Authority-PSA concerning petroleum’s activities. In addition PSA 
made other regulations applicable in full or in parts through the HSE regulations and 
the temporary regulations. Such regulations are basically those set by the Flag State, like 
NMD, and classification society eg. DNV. Further more, PSA recommend, as seen in figure 
21, for offshore units the application of guidelines recommended for maritime operations by 
recognized standards like in NORSOK Standards in Norway and international maritime 
regulations set by IMO. PSA does not set construction requirements, guidelines or maritime 
safety rules for vessels but it always refers to NMD regulations with matter related to offshore 
activities especially when dealing with rules and regulations concerning for example standby 
vessels and AHTS and permanent storage ship shaped vessels. 
When it comes to the general requirements for construction and fitting of vessels operating 
offshore in the Norwegian Continental Shelf, it is regulated by the concerned vessel’s Flag 
State. This implies that the Flag State of the vessels is to be responsible for regulating and 
supervision of the vessel’s maritime safety, i.e. construction, stability, crew, safety for 
certification and navigation. 
The term installation is applied in both PSA and NMD regulations though it is clearly 
observed as a definition under NMD regulation of a mobile offshore unit in contrary to the 
term facility under the PSA regulation. For clarity the following diagram describes the 
Norwegian rules and regulations environment with respect to outfitting, construction and 
certification of a facility and a vessel.   
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Figure 21. Flow diagram illustrating the rules and regulation environment in the NCS. 
 
4.2 MOBILE FACILITY 
 
The set of rules for petroleum activities, differentiate clearly mainly a facility from a vessel. 
These rules set more comprehensive and stringent requirements for installations than vessels. 
However a facility in order to taking part in petroleum activities have to be qualified to 
receive an Acknowledgement of Compliance (AoC) as a result of the law dated 1st January 
2004 which says that AoC is mandatory to all mobile facilities. 
In Norway, a facility is built according to the PSA regulations and should as a recommended 
practice comply with the Flag State requirements set for Mobile Offshore Units as stipulated 
in the Red Book of NMD to be registered in the Norwegian shipping register. PSA’s 
regulations cover Working Environment Act and the Petroleum Act as well it refers to 
recognized standards like NORSOK standards. Regulations which are stipulate in Framework 
HSE, Management, Task/ Duty Information and Activities are concerned for both new and 
existing facilities. 
Under PSA regulations in Framework HSE section 4 d, a facility is defined as an installation, 
plant and other equipment for petroleum activities, however not supply and support vessels or 
ships that transport petroleum in bulk. The term facility also comprises pipeline and cable 
unless otherwise provided. 
It is mandatory for installations to comply fully with both the regulations set in the Petroleum 
Act and the Working Environment Act in contrary to a vessel. It is evident from subsection 1 
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 856 ‐ Regulations 
for Construction of 
MOU 
Acknowledgement of 
Compliance (AoC /SUT) 
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litera d second indent, certain limitations are made to the substantive scope of application in 
relation to the Petroleum Act which entail more limited application of the Working 
Environment Act to some extent as a vessel function is concerned. 
The NMD subdivision for mobile offshore units certifies all units which operate under 
Norwegian flag. It also maintains already existing Letters of Compliance for installations 
under foreign flags which have documented that they satisfy Norwegian requirements. The 
subdivision provides assistance to PSA in matters related to maritime authorization in the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf. 
NMD uses a term unit according to the regulations FOR 1987-09-04 nr. 856: Regulations on 
construction of mobile offshore units, where paragraph §1.1 defines a unit as: “a mobile 
platform, including drill ship, which is equipped for drilling an under sea petroleum deposits, 
and mobile floating platform for other uses than drilling under sea petroleum deposits”. 
Further some parts of NMD regulations are applied additionally concerning mobile offshore 
units: 
 regulations § 38 for ballast systems 
 regulations § 63 for stability with respect to §21 
 regulations § 64 for anchorage, mooring and positioning 
 regulations § 65 for turret 
DNV regulations and standards for mobile facilities are considered to be leading in the world, 
and these are often used as references in the industry. Some countries’ authorities approve 
maritime certificates and give approval to facilities operations with reference to the DNV 
class notation. In Norway the DNV standards are referred to in the set of PSA regulations 
where these classification regulations and standards are accepted as basis for consent and 
acquisition of an AoC for a mobile facility. DNV has international experience with offshore 
classification; its classified units operate world wide according to the regulations in force 
issued by IMO. Mobile facilities with DNV class operate under different kinds of climatic and 
oceanographic conditions and satisfy the strictest requirements set, for example in frozen seas. 
For mobile facilities in general, there will always be a list of deviations, since it is not possible 
to comply with all the requirements at all times. This is due to ever changing regulations, for 
example, NMD’s regulations in the Red Book for mobile installations are revised every 4th 
year, such that a new revised version issued will be the one in force. 
 
4.3 THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A VESSEL AND A FACILITY 
 
As mentioned in the previous subchapters, the requirements for vessels and facilitis would be 
very different. In this subchapter, a focus is made in explaining the main differences between 
vessels and installations by using few key factors in order to present more clearly in the 
technical aspects. The requirements for the mobile facilities are in many aspects considerably 
stricter in relation to ship regulations as see in NMD regulations §6 & §7 for mobile offshore 
units, for example: 
 
4.3.1 HULL AND REQUIREMENTS FOR CONSTRUCTION MATERIAL (STEEL GRADE) 
 
The NMD Red Book for registration of mobile offshore units, stipulate in chapter V §6 that a 
unit should be built to suit unfavorable combination of maximum environmental loads, where 
under PSA facility regulation section 10 Loads, load effects and resistance it is stated that 
“accidental loads and environmental loads with an annual probability greater than or equal 
to 1x10-4 shall not cause the loss of a main safety function,”. PSA requires better 
documentation on steel quality for approval and DNV have set standards with regard to 
explosion analysis. The facility must also be subjected to several analyses for design 
verifications related to structural integrity thereto increasing capital costs as direct 
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consequence. PSA refers to the application of DNV offshore standards which give the 
notation 1A1 to a mobile offshore unit with hull, marine machinery and equipment found to 
be in compliance with the basic (common) requirements of the applicable DNV rules. 
 
Additionally there must be separate systems with fire class bulkheads between engine room 
and engine control room. The installation must also be equipped with an emergency bridge in 
case of fire on the main bridge with requirement for fire class walls between interior and main 
deck in case of hydrocarbon fire. The requirement states that the fire should be contained for 
60 minutes without spreading from one engine room to another, or from one bridge to 
another. 
Since there is a great danger of leakage of hydrocarbons on a deck there is a requirement for a 
separate collecting system or so called “hazardous drain (fluid)”. The size of the drainage 
system would depend on which class an installation is built according to. 
 
4.3.2 DAMAGE STABILITY AND BALLAST SYSTEM 
 
Stricter requirements are also applied for an installation than those for a vessel when it 
concerns stability. An installation would have a requirement to tolerate a leakage in to 
compartments after a possible collision while for a vessel the requirement is to tolerate 
leakage in one compartment without having a serious effect on stability. Stability regulation 
in §21, requires that the waterline into the final state of equilibrium after flooding taking into 
account the effect of wind, should be below any openings, such as air pipes, ventilators,  that 
may lead into progressive flooding of the compartment. 
The ballast system should have at least 2 independent pumps arranged such that ballast could 
be pumped in the event of failure of any pump. The ballast system ought to be capable of 
changing the installation draught from any transit draught to survival draught within 3hours. 
 
4.3.3 WORKING ENVIRONMENT WITH RESPECT TO NOISE, VIBRATIONS AND 
ILLUMINATION CONDITIONS 
 
4.3.3.1  WORKING ENVIRONMENT 
 
The Working Environment Act requires employees’ participation during design verification 
phase in order to shape their working place (this requirement does not apply to vessels).  
Under Working Environment Act section 2-3. Part (1) the employees are required to provide 
cooperation on the design, its implementation and follow-up of the undertaking’s systematic 
work on issues related to health, environment and safety. Further more, employees shall as 
well take part in the organized safety and environmental work of the undertaking and shall 
actively cooperate on implementation of measures to create a satisfactory and safe working 
environment (6).  
 
4.3.3.2  NOISE 
 
Installations are required to have better noise reduction and noise damping measures (e.g. 
super silent thrusters).  It is required to locate in separate rooms noisy equipment and 
equipment with high structure-borne sound emission levels and areas with noisy activities e.g. 
lay down areas, and workshops, within the immediate vicinity of areas with a noise level limit 
of 50 dB(A) or below, e.g. offices, hospital, central control room, sleeping/recreation areas. 
 
Separation of unmanned machine rooms (UMS) with several noise sources is required such 
that maintenance work can be performed on machines not in operation without being exposed 
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to noise levels above 90 dB(A). NORSOK S-002 section 5.5.4 as well requires that maximum 
exposure noise level not exceeding 83 dB (A) for an individual employee during 12hrs of a 
work day. 
 
4.3.3.3  VIBRATIONS 
 
It is observed that vibration limits are based on boundaries given in ISO 2631, where in 
NORSOK Standard S-002 are referred, and under section 5. 5.5.0-2 Annex D of the standard 
it is required that the application of vibrations exposure acceptability based on 12hrs working 
day be used for human beings. The maximum limits for continuous whole body vibration 
from machinery and equipment cover the range from 1 Hz to 80 Hz in which the major body 
resonance occurs. 
 
4.3.3.4  ILLUMINATION 
 
In the design of the lighting, the level of illumination and location of lamps shall make it easy 
to see obstructions, steps in corridors, walkways etc. Under the of NORSOK Standard section 
5.6.0-13, guidelines are provided where different levels of luminance and light colours may 
be required to create comfortable environment. “Warm different colours should be used in 
cabins and recreation areas where the lighting levels are below 500 lux and high colour 
temperature, whiter light, should be used in areas with high lighting levels” like in engine 
rooms and confined spaces. 
 
4.3.4 ANCHORAGE / DYNAMIC POSITIONING WITH RESPECT TO DP CLASS 
 
The NORSOK Standard J-003 Rev. 2, August 1997 provides guidelines for mobile offshore 
units where they shall equipped with DP class from 1-3 for varies operations (see table 1 in 
NORSOK J-003). For wireline operations on subsea wells with SLIS the unit should be 
equipped with DP class 2 to comply for the minimum requirement, i.e. there must be 
independent references for the DP system. 
For DP operators the standard refers to training in accordance with NMD Guideline No 23: 
“Certification of DP operators”, further training from other institutions than those listed in the 
guidelines may be accepted. The NMD Red Book regulations § 6 (857/87) requires that a unit 
be kept in place with necessary accuracy and reliability under all weather condition. 
 
4.3.5 INTERIOR REQUIREMENTS FOR CORRIDORS, DOORS AND LADDER 
 
The regulations in the NMD red book give standard specifications for a facility interior 
construction where corridors should have minimum size to allow stretcher to pass without 
constrains and protruded area, must be equipped with portable breathing apparatus, and fitted 
with standard size doors with breadth of 600mm and height of 2050mm. 
It is required as well in §15 that an installation be fitted with stairs of standard size steps 
150x1600 instead of ladders for crane operators, further should stairs have railings and an 
inclination less than o50 . Ladders could be used with maximum height of 9m, and where the 
height exceeds 12m ladder should have 6m interval and be fitted with a rest platform.  It is 
required that all beds shall stand over deck floor with minimum length of 2.2 m 
 
4.3.6 MACHINERY AND EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY 
 
Generator/engines have their own external fresh air and exhaust (pipes) ventilation system for 
turbocharger with no gas detection system. However, turbocharger’s air suction system is 
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required to be equipped with a Rig Saver (applied as valves). The purpose of the valves is to 
chock the engine during shut down so that it doesn’t get any air/gas. 
The Rig Saver functions as a chocking device when an engine starts sucking in gas. The HC 
gas when sucked, will increase combustion and thereby higher engine revolutions. In order to 
maintain desired revolutions, the engine’s regulator will provide less fuel to the engine. This 
works fine until the moment the engine sucks inn so much gas that it operates only on gas. 
Then there will be an increase in revolutions again and lead to no possibility of regulating 
engine speed such that there wont be any other means of stopping the engine. At this stage the 
Rig Saver steps in and chokes/stops the engine. This prevents the engine to overspeed which 
may lead to total breakdown, therefore it requirement for an installation to be equipped with a 
complete EsD system which is not necessarily needed on a vessel (17).  
 
Facilities are required to be equipped with an independent emergency power supply which is 
arranged and constructed to provide continuous power in not less than 18 hours in 
unfavorable inclining angle with respect to stability regulations paragraph §21. The protocol 
for certification of emergency power supply under paragraph §11, requires test the 
performance of a prototype under the inclination angle of 22.5 degrees combining with 10 
degrees for trim especially for ship shaped units. The test should be conducted with maximum 
loading for not less than 4 hours. This is a general requirement that concerns as well vessel as 
described in the NMD regulations. (FOR 1987-09-04 nr 856: regulations for construction of 
mobile offshore units) 
 
4.3.7 STRICTER REQUIREMENTS FOR LIFE SAVING APPLIANCES 
 
Chapter 2 paragraph §9 of NMD Red Book set requirements for life saving appliances and 
launching arrangement of life boats, where under the guidelines on regulations related to 
design and outfitting of offshore facilities in Petroleum Activities, regulation iii-iv 
on Emergency Preparedness resection 40 on equipment for rescue of personnel, an installation 
is required to be equipment with two independent man overboard boat systems (MOB boat 
systems). 
The requirements of interior and life saving appliances on a facility will also be stricter than 
that on a vessel, i.e. an installation must satisfy as well NORSOK standard in the following 
aspects: 
(i) hospital, plus a prepared emergency hospital, 
(ii) more lifeboats of the freefall type. 
 
4.3.8 FIRE-, GAS DETECTION PROTECTION/PREVENTION SYSTEM 
 
NMD requires that the mobile offshore unit be outfitted with gas detection and alarm system 
of two levels of concentration. For HC gas the low level, LAL, should be 20% and 60% for 
high level, LAH, for H2S gas a low level of concentration should be at 10ppm and high level 
set at 20 ppm (Red Book §25). Under paragraph §26 it is required that emergency shut down 
of ventilation system for accommodation to be activated at LEL, that includes shut down of  
damper / throttle valve /flap for air uptake for installation and machinery. 
 
4.3.9 MANNING REQUIREMENTS WITH RESPECT TO TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION 
 
For the crew on a vessel normally there would be 4-4 work plan on normal bases, while on a 
facility it is required by the regulations that the personnel should follow 2-4 work, thereby 
lead to an increase in operational costs since more crew will be needed fro an installation. 
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Under the Working environment Act section 10-3 on work schedule states that the schedule 
shall be prepared in cooperation with the employees’ elected representatives and be accessible 
for employee at the latest, two weeks prior to its implementation. In section 10-4, it is 
specified that normal working hours must not exceed nine hours per 24 hours and 40 hours 
per seven days. Overtime work must not exceed ten hours per seven days, 25 hours per four 
consecutive weeks or 200 hours during a period of 52 weeks (6).  
 
4.3.10 ERGONOMIC DESIGN 
 
PSA facility regulation section 19 requires that the work areas and work equipment be 
designed and located to avoid employees’ subjection to adverse physical or mental strain as a 
result of manual handling, work position, repetitive movements or work intensity, which may 
cause injury or illness. Workplaces and equipments ought be designed and placed to reduce 
danger of mistakes that may be significant to safety. Individual work positions shall be 
provided at workplaces to enable the possibility of work operations to be carried out safely. 
 
4.4 REGULATIONS IN THE PETROLEUM ACT WITH REGARD TO APPLICATION ON A VESSEL 
OR FACILITY 
 
There has been a discussion for a long time regarding the difference between a vessel and a 
mobile facility. Based on the few regulations which were undergone and focused on, its 
shows there are clear guidelines of what differentiates a vessel from a facility, but the 
discussion is often about which tasks that can be done by a vessel, and which tasks that must 
be conducted by a facility. In the regulations it is stated clearly that all activities with 
equipment for petroleum activities, with exception of freight if not specified otherwise, would 
require a facility, refer to the Act relating to petroleum activities §1-6, d. 
In the Act relating to petroleum activities §1-6, c a petroleum activity is defined as: 
“petroleum activity, all activities associated with subsea petroleum deposits, including 
exploration, exploration drilling, production, transportation, utilization and 
decommissioning, including planning of such activities, but not including, however transport 
of petroleum in bulk by ship”. 
Therefore it is not determined that all type of petroleum activities would require a facility 
since the concept petroleum activity can be discussed and varies in a scope. This means that 
every single case must be discussed and evaluated before one can say anything about which 
rules must be followed. So it is the activity which will determine the use of a facility or a 
vessel. 
In the guidelines for Framework HSE §2 there is an information that opens a discussion 
regarding this moment. It states that among other things, activities as simple pumping 
activities without well control (entry to the well barrier) or disassembly on secured and 
abandoned wells, as well as maintenance work on well template and wellheads without 
penetration of well barriers are considered as activities which can be done by a vessel. 
For mobile facilities which are within maritime operational concept, section 2 about appliance 
of maritime regulations in the petroleum activities in the Framework HSE, opens up for one to 
choose to use other relevant technical requirements according to NMD regulations in addition 
to technical requirements according to the petroleum activities (MOU regulations) within the 
framework HSE section 3 on the use of maritime legislation in the petroleum activities. 
Section 3 in Framework HSE states as follows: 
For mobile facilities which are registered in a national shipping register and which follow 
maritime operational concept, all relevant technical requirements in NMD regulations stated 
after revision in 2003 and regulations of 2007 and 2008 mentioned in the third paragraph, 
together with supplementary DNV classification requirements, or international flag state 
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regulations with the class regulations achieving the same safety level, can be used as basis for 
alternatives of technical requirements which are indicated in the Petroleum Activities Act, 
with the following specifications and limitations: 
This paragraph applies to only regulations related to maritime matters which are not directly 
connected to the petroleum activities which a facility would conduct. The paragraph does not 
comprise the following provisions: 
  drilling and process equipment, 
  universal sound and light alarms, 
  equipment used for transportation of personnel and requirements to transportation 
of personnel on the drill floor, 
  other provisions on the working environment, 
  the activities to be carried out in the petroleum activities. 
 
PSA can set additional requirements regarding aspects as mentioned in §3 when these 
requirements can be explained based on safety related considerations. The regulation can also 
among other things include mobile facilities, well intervention vessels, multiuse installations 
and some types of mobile production facilities. The regulation includes therefore no immobile 
installations, mobile production installations which are permanently placed, storage ships and 
similar, i.e. an installation which shall operate on a field in a long time with permanent place 
and therefore does not satisfy assumptions within maritime operational and maintenance 
concept. 
This leads to a conclusion that for given activities one can differentiate between a vessel and 
equipment which would be used for the activity. Any exemptions granted by the flag state 
authority shall be assessed and presented to the PSA for approval if they are of significance to 
safety in the petroleum activities. Meanwhile an AoC will be granted by PSA to the fact that 
the technical condition of a mobile facility and the applicant's organisation and management 
system are considered to be in compliance with relevant requirements in Norwegian shelf 
legislation. 
 
4.5 COST EVALUATION FOR WELL INTERVENTION BY THE USE OF MOBILE FACILITIES 
 
The focus on safety efficiency and cost reduction are the key parameters in the innovation of 
mobile facilities in the oil and gas industry.  The IOR need especially for subsea wells is 
challenging and it is a drive mechanism for development of new ways to approach and 
conduct intervention/ maintenance activities on subsea fields.  Thereby, new built state of the 
art and fit for purpose vessels compete with existing drill rig to perform work-over and 
intervention tasks. Operators focus in cost reduction during the production life of the oil/gas 
fields without costing the environment and jeopardy of personnel safety and loss of property. 
 
Well intervention deployment technology is detailed dealt in chapter 5 with special emphasis 
on the conventional and new generation technology available for performing the task safely 
and effectively. In this subchapter, cost comparison is the main focus with the evaluation of 
performing intervention activities without violating stringent requirements and regulations set 
by international and local regulatory bodies like MMS, PSA in the GOM and NCS 
respectively.  There are several factors to be considered for selection of a mobile facility for 
performing a specific task safely and cost efficiently.  
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4.5.1 MOBILIZATION OF A MOBILE FACILITY 
 
The transit time required to mobilizing a drilling rig to and at the field is considerable longer 
compared to the RLWI/WI -VESSEL. The following factors should be considered: 
 Mobilization of the facility to the field; 
o Transit time from port to the field and tow requirements – a mobile dilling rig 
sometime will require means of towing, AHTS, to the field, in contrast to the 
vessel which will travel fast by own means of propulsion.    
o Weather condition under transit period – under worse sea state a drilling rig 
like a semi-submersible will have to seek refugee in a sheltered harbor and 
wait on weather.   
 Mobilization/demobilization of intervention equipments on site; 
o Mobilization /rig up of well control package (BOP, LMRP, riser system) and 
making up of tool string for RIH/POOH depending on the number of runs 
while performing the task. Fill up of the riser system with fluid for establishing 
a barrier during operation. 
o Test requirements to be performed on site for well control package prior to 
carrying out intervention operations. 
o Demobilization/rig down of intervention equipment. 
 
4.5.2 WEATHER/CLIMATIC CONDITION  
 
Weather condition limits the operation window of a facility with respect to geographical 
location of the field where intervention operations have to be carried out. A comparison can 
be made when operation in summer time has to be carried out, the significant wave height, 
Hs, in NCS range from 3-8m with wave peak period from 4-8sec while in West Africa coast 
there are long swells with Hs ranging from 7-10m with peak period from 10-14sec (21). Small 
intervention facilities (RLWI/WI –VESSEL) motion characteristics are sensitive to waves 
induced motions compared to a drilling rig. This may result in high down time while waiting 
on weather (WoW). Wave induced motions to the drill rig relative to the sea bed should be 
compensated by a heave compensation system therefore calculated significant wave height for 
a mobile facility will limit the availability of  a mobile facility thus increase its costs. Waves 
will induce translation motions in heave to a facility that will influence the position, velocity 
and acceleration of mobile floating facility relative to the seabed.  
a) The position of a facility on the wave has influence in helicopter operations, effects 
vertical lifting operation as well as influences the necessary displacement length of 
heave compensation equipments.  
 
Position of a facility at time, t:  t sin
2
)( 0Htzh   
Amplitude: 
2
)(max
Htzh   
 
b) The velocity of a facility due to heave motion will affect helicopter operations, speed of 
lifting operations, and influence HPU capacity with respect to response to hydraulic 
flow needs in compensation equipment. Tool string vertical motions in the well would 
lead to pumping /piston-effect.  
Velocity in heave of a facility at time, t:  t)( cos
2
)( 00 Htzh 

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Amplitude: 0max 2
)( Htzh   
 
c) The acceleration induced by heave motions will influence vertical forces as well as 
fastening of cargo and equipment on deck. The acceleration will may influence the 
working ability of crew due to seasickness effect.   
 
Acceleration:  t)( sin
2
)( 0
2
0 Htzh 

 
Amplitude: 20max 2
)( Htz h   (13) 
 
Down time cost due to waiting on weather a relative smaller for a RLWI/WI VESSEL 
compared to a rig. This is due to the factor that the costs of hiring a small fit for purpose 
intervention facility is lower as indicated on figure 23 rig chase decision tree.  
 
4.5.3 COMPARISON OF DRIFT COSTS/ CHARGES PER DAY FOR MOBILE 
FACILITIES. 
 
The charges/cost associated to perform a mobile drilling rig is higher than for a small 
intervention facility. The cost of hire per day is indicated in figure 22 as presented by 
Shlumberger in 2006, and currently the values for a drilling rig are ranging from drilling rigs 
are $600,000 and $700,000 per day (25).  
 
 
 
Figure 22. Subsea Well Intervention costs for different intervention levels in 2006. 
 
.  
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4.5.4 SCOPE OF INTERVENTION ACTIVITY TO BE PERFORMED. 
 
It is seen clearly that specific well task and the scope of intervention activity would require a 
special type of a mobile facility.  In P&A, the well status would set the bases for selection of a 
facility. Drilling rigs have no limitation with regard to weight handling capabilities compared 
to a small intervention facility where its MHT sets the limitation in weight taking into 
consideration pulling tubing section. Due to the handling capability for heavy lift for a drilling 
rig, a tubing hunger and whole of production liner tubing can be removed during P&A. It is 
cheaper to perform P&A by the use of a small intervention facility rather than using a drilling 
rig. In rig chase approach where a rig is moved from a plugged well to perform drilling 
activities to a new well serves time and costs. The small facility is easily mobilized to the site 
and casing strings cutting and recovery of the WH will be performed in a short time and 
saving costs. The evaluation of costs for achieving a WH cutting by drilling rig and small 
intervention facility for well status in CAT 1 done by IOSS is illustrated in figure 23.    
 
 
 
Figure 23. Rig chase decision tree (source IOSS) 
 
4.5.5 SECTION MILLING OPERATION  
 
Intervention activities by wireline or CT are limited in P&A operation taking into 
consideration section milling of a casing string or liner. These deployment methods can only 
perform packer and scale milling operations as well slot recovery by side tracking for CT with 
a whipstock. A tractor deployed by e-line can be anchored in the production tubing inner wall 
by friction and perform scale milling.  The number of runs will depend on the length of 
affected area. Section milling of a casing string or production tubing cannot be performed by 
wireline or CT due to the weight requirement and means of cutting due to effect of buckling 
and control weight requirements. Section milling is done by drill rigs which have capability of 
providing tension load on the casing/ liner to be section milled, circulate cutting (steel debris) 
as well put enough weight on the milling assembly.  
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5.0 ESTABLISHMENT AND DESCRIPTION OF MOBILE FACILITY EQUIPMENT PACKAGE FOR 
WELL INTERVENTION. 
 
Workover and Intervention control systems packages for subsea well intervention are 
established by identifying primary the scope of work/maintenance to be carried out down the 
well.  The reasons for workover and well intervention are as follows; 
 Production management of the well: 
• Maintain or Improve production levels (IOR), 
• Repair wellbore mechanical failures, 
• Terminate / suspend production. 
 Well logging/survey – mapping status-data gathering and well diagnostics: 
• Flow characteristics , 
• Geological data, 
• Fluids data. 
 Altering the state of the well and/or well geometry: 
• Pro-actively(planned) or Re-actively (unplanned/failure), 
• Shut off unwanted water production, 
• Reservoir Stimulation / Fracturing, 
• Re-perforating the production intervals or establishing new intervals, 
• Open/closing valves, 
• Replacing parts, 
• Removing scale or wax precipitates, 
• Setting plugs, 
• Sand removal. 
 
5.1 WELL WORKOVER AND INTERVENTION  
 
Downhole remedial operations into the well may be conducted remotely from a production 
station through flowline (TFL methods). By pumping TFL conveyed tools maintenance tasks 
like change out of instruments and replacement of e.g. SCSSV can be accomplished (ISO 
13628 Standard).  
 
5.1.1 DEFINITION 
 
The terms workover and intervention differ in several aspects, where workover implies full 
overhaul/recompletion of the well by the use of a full bore BOP, drilling riser and rig used for 
completion work in contrary to intervention commonly used to imply all kind of light vertical 
intervention activities (maintenance) done during a well production life. In light well 
intervention vertical operations take place in open water and inside through SSLS, the XT and 
the tubing by the use of small mobile facilities termed “small riserless intervention vessel”. 
Workover and well intervention activities are categories as follows: 
Category A:  Workover by the use of a rig with fullbore BOP and marine riser. 
Category B:  Medium well intervention, with smaller bore riser. 
Category C:  Light well intervention (LWI), wireline operations in open water and 
through SSLS as a well control package. 
The categorization system is defined in different perspectives with respect to parties of 
interest in the oil industry (14).  
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Table 4. Categorization system for Workover and Well intervention activities. 
PARTIES OF INTEREST 
CATEGORY 
A 
Light 
B 
Medium 
C   
Heavy 
Operator 
(StaoilHydro) Riseless (SSLIS) WOI Riser 
Full bore BOP & 
Drilling Riser 
 
Contractor 
(Island Offshore) 
Light  
Riseless (SSLIS) 
Medium Heavy  CT TTRD 
 
Standard 
(ISO 13628) 
Light  Heavy 
SS Wireline Most Conventional  
SS Reel Tools   
 
5.1.2 DEPLOYMENT TECHNOLOGY 
 
The type of intervention methodology and scope of work accomplished will depend on 
deployment technology.   For well intervention categories A-Light and B- Medium, the most 
common deploying technology for a tool string (BHA) is by clickline, wireline and coiled 
tubing. The description and scope of work each technology can accomplish is defined as 
follows:    
 Slickline deployment technology:  
• Monofilament wire used to mechanically convey tools into wellbore. 
• High tensile wire spooled on and off a powered drum (reel system) 
 Scope of work performed by slickline is pulling only. 
 Wireline deployment technology:  
• Multi-strand cable for mechanical conveyance of tools into wellbore, as well as 
provide an electrical / fiber optic communication path to the operator. 
• High tensile cable spooled on and off a powered drum. 
 Scope of work performed by wireline = pulling and communication. 
 Coiled Tubing deployment technology : 
• Rolled & Welded continuous length of steel tubing which is used to convey 
tools, provide communication path, as well as provide a fluid flow path. 
• Coiled tube spooled on and off a reel, utilizing an “Injector” system. 
• Tube can have integrated Wireline.  
Scope of work performed by CT = pulling, communication, pushing and pumping.  
 
5.1.3 MAINTENANCE ON SEABED EQUIPMENTS 
 
ISO 13628 Standard paragraph 8.7.3 “Seabed equipment maintenance”, defines the scope of 
work that can be done subsea on XT, WH, control modules, valves, manifold, template, 
flowlines and connections, riser bases and riser system. Generally the scope of intervention is 
done by module replacement conducted by deploying tools on pipework strings, wirelines and 
ROV, or manned intervention methods (wet divers). Further repairs may be carried out in-situ 
by ROTs, ROVs or accomplished by mono- or hyperbaric diving without recovery of 
equipments to the surface.  
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5.1.4 COMMON PROBLEMS EXPECTED TO BE ENCOUNTERED DURING 
EXECUTION OF INTERVENTION OPERATIONS 
 
Well control is a priority number one for accomplishment of successful and safe well 
intervention operation. Several safety aspects should be taken into consideration with regards 
to expected risks that may be encountered prior and during the operation  which may raise 
liability issues to human, facilities, well and environment.  
 Safety: 
• Hazardous working environment:  
• Personnel risk, 
• Movement (accelerations), Pressure (blowout and explosion), Weather 
(limiting availability), Heavy Lifts (falling objects). 
 Risk of environmental release in case of lost of well control. 
 Lack of close contact with intervention systems / tooling: 
• Loss of senses (direct) / feedback 
• HMI (Human Machine Interface) gap by taking into consideration the vertical 
distance from the vessel at water surface up to the well located 10,000ft 
subsea. 
 Variable weather conditions, wind, waves and 
current may frequently limit the operation 
(vessel availability) by inducing translation 
motions (heave, sway and surge) and rotations 
(roll, yaw and pitch) on a vessel as illustrated in 
figure 24. The vertical motion, especially heave, 
speed and acceleration are critical for achieving a 
safe and successful operation with respect to 
lighter mobile facilities motion characteristics.  
 
 
 Dynamic working relationship 
• Between a work platform (vessel) and wellhead (on seabed) may impose cyclic 
tensile forces on the wellhead as well as pumping effect inside the well. 
 
5.2 PROCEDURES AND LINE OF COMMUNICATION PRIOR TO INITIATION OF SUBSEA WELL 
INTERVENTION.  
 
Procedures for conducting well intervention activities should be clearly defined prior to 
execution of the activities down hole. ISO 13628 standards paragraph 8.7.2.3 requires prior 
preparation of procedures in advance of initiating any subsea maintenance operation. Work 
plan should be indicated and coordination with other concurrent field activities clearly 
defined, including the list of materials, equipments and services required for the specific 
operation should be in place.   
 
 The platform will hand over the well to mobile facility after the DP trial by the facility has 
been conducted with sufficient heading, and an ROV survey conducted before opening the 
hatches on subsea template. After the well has been handled over to the facility, the rig up 
procedure for well intervention will be carried out in accordance with the contractor’s, and 
other alliances manual. The communication during LWI operations will be conducted as 
described in the figure 25. 
Figure 24. Six Degrees of  Freedom 
of a vessel. 
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Figure 25.  Line of communication during LWI operations (source Island Offshore). 
 
5.3 DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM COMPONENTS FOR RLWIS  
 
The RLWI system enables wireline tooling to enter the well without using a rigid riser 
connection between the subsea production tree and the small mobile facility. The major 
benefit is reduced cost and operational time compared with use of a rig for interventions.  The 
use of a mono-hull vessel service saves time since no riser needs to be installed and can move 
between oil fields much faster than a traditional intervention rig. Further, due to the fact that 
both the vessel and equipment costs are less, makes the RLWI service preferable for Light 
Well Intervention operations.  
 
FMC has currently two types of RLWI systems. The first generation RLWI Mark I system 
and the RLWI Mark II system are designed according to the marked requirements for a next 
generation light well intervention system.  
 
RLWI-VESSELs are mostly equipped with the existing system for intervention termed Mark 
I. The WI- VESSEL Island Constructor will be equipped with the new generation of subsea 
well control package for intervention Mark II developed by FMC (20). 
 
 
5.3.1 SUBSEA INTERVENTION STACK CONFIGURATION 
 
The conventional type of subsea intervention stack Mark I comprises of the following; 
 PCH: has three WBE: 
• Grease Injection tubes, 
• A single and dual stuffing box, with independent auto grease supply, 
• Ball check valve. 
 The ULP has one wire line shear seal ram (WSSR). 
 The LIP has three WBE: 
• 7’’ gate valve Upper Production Valve UPIV, 
• 7’’ gate valve Lower Production Valve LPIV, 
• 7’’ shear seal ram, SSR. 
 Stack is pressure rated to 10.000 psi: 
• Test frequency according to RLWI Operation manual, 
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• Test criteria for the well and lubricator stack is defined by StatoilHydro Well 
Program. 
 
5.3.2 PROCEDURE FOR RUNNING BHA FOR WIRELINE (RLWI). 
 
Rig up procedure: 
 Removal of debris cover. 
 Removal of tree cap. 
 Run pressure test stack (LLP/LIP). 
 Run upper lubricator package (ULP). 
 Rig up wire line, prepare and run PCH. 
• Tool string position, 
• Run tool string in tandem with PCH, 
• Remove ULP debris-cover by ROV, 
• Lower tool string down to ULP/PCH connector (ROV 
pilot), 
• ROV guide tool string with C-ring – guide/entering cone, 
• Open PCH – connector and remove guide/entering cone by 
ROV, 
• Run tool string and deploy PCH, 
• Land PCH – close connector, 
• Release PCHRT and retrieve to surface. 
 Flushing of lubricator opening up to well: FMC. 
 Well operations and testing of XT-valves: Statoil well program. 
 Retrieval and rerun of PCH in between wireline run. 
 Flushing of lubricator – abandon XT; FMC: 
• Retrieve ULP. 
• Pull stack (LLP/LIP). 
• Run tree cap, TC. 
• Install debris-cover, close hatch.  
• ROV-survey and well handover. Statoil instruction.  
Mark II show in figure 26 is a new generation of Mark I SLIS. 
 
 
 
5.3.3 BARRIER PHILOSOPHY / WELL STATUS 
 
All wire-line operations shall be performed with 2 barrier elements to prevent uncontrolled 
blow out from the well to its surroundings: one active barrier and one passive barrier. 
‐ Consent IOM/IOSS and Alliance partners: shall assist oil operating company with 
compilation of all relevant documentation and data received for application of 
regulatory consents or permit required to conduct LWI – operations. 
‐ LWI Project manual, 
‐ Well Program: Unique LWI Well Program describing step by step activities. 
 
5.4 STATE OF THE ART IN TECHNOLOGY ADVANCEMENT   
 
Due to technology advancement the new state of the art fit for purpose build facilities like 
Island Contractor is planned to be equipped with a new state of the art well intervention 
package comprising CT and small bore rigid riser system to increase the scope of work done 
Figure 26. RLWIS Mark II 
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by light well intervention mobile facilities. The notations WI-VESSEL and RLWI-VESSEL 
are used with Island Offshore AS to indicate an intervention mobile facilities equipped with 
small bore rigid riser system and riserless system respectively. 
 
5.4.1 GENERAL 
 
Island Constructor as a Floating Well Intervention facility (mono hull vessel) shall perform 
the following operations (more concrete of the facility specification in attachment 5): 
• Wire-line services with the use of SSLS 
• Sub sea construction and equipment installation 
• Structural prepared for CT operations with rigid WI riser system 
• P&A work 
 The topside equipment and systems installed above the WI-VSSEL’s main deck and 
moon pool area, including related equipment and systems for special reasons located 
below main deck. The topside is modularized including the derrick structure and 
dedicated area allocated for alternative services. The facility is equipped with utilities 
for CT operations with rigid riser and deck lay-put and MHT adapted to such 
operations.  
 Scope of work and services: Perform well intervention services for maintenance and 
IOR for existing subsea oil/gas field. DP-vessel designed constructed, equipped and 
certified for world wide operations, except US inland waters, Baltic Sea, Black Sea 
and similar areas with special restrictions and requirements.  
 Prime area of operations: North Sea at depth from 70-800 meters and well depth of up 
to 7500 m measured depth with pressure control equipment rated to 690 bar working 
pressure and main winch capacity for water depth down to 1000 m.  
 Permanent installed ROV system consisting of 2 work ROVs. 
 Facilities to assist in template installation work and seabed construction, installation 
and maintenance work.  
 Well intervention services performed by using a subsea lubricator system and in 
addition the vessel is designed to perform CT operations with rigid riser system.  
 Basic design criteria and vessels main particulars ULSTEIN SX121  
 Specific requirements: 
The requirements are subdivided into the following categories: 
• Flag state and Registration, 
• Statutory requirements, 
• Classification Society Rules, 
• Certificates, 
• Applicable Codes and Standards. 
 General services and operations: The WI-Vessel accommodates a full wire-line and 
electric logging package and CT operation. The Topside is equipped with adequate 
material-handling and guiding-system such that it provides a high level of safety and 
efficient handling of all equipment during rig-up/mobilization throughout operations, 
and during rig-down/demobilization. For achievement of safe working environment it 
is recommended that all piping and cabling be permanent installed. For safety reasons 
equipments are arranged to avoid working over open sea and the use of riding-belts 
during routine operations.  
 
1. SSLS operations by the use of slickline and E-line: 
‐ Running/retrieving DSV, 
‐ Running/retrieving plugs and bridge plug 
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‐ Running/retrieving wire-line set pressure and temperature gauges, 
‐ Operating sliding sleeves, 
‐ Slickline caliper surveys, 
‐ Locking open TR Safety Valves (TRSSSV), 
‐ Wire-line toolstring fishing, 
‐ Slickline logging, 
‐ Perforation operations, 
‐ Power Truck Advance to deploy mechanical tools and electrical pyrotechnical. 
 
2. CT operations through Rigid Riser, services: 
‐ Retrieve crown plug by wire-line, 
‐ Pay out coil to desired depth and start pumping, 
‐ Well cleaning and sand jetting, 
‐ Milling, scale removal, 
‐ Gas lift, 
‐ Acidizing and simulation, 
‐ Squeeze jobs, 
‐ Setting of packers and cement plugs, 
‐ Displacement of fluids, 
‐ Fishing, 
 
5.4.2 KILL SYSTEM WITH MANIFOLD AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT 
 
Mixing system for adding dry/liquid chemicals into kill fluid is installed on the mezzaniene 
deck aft (3x20m3 tanks for mixing purpose) and in addition a 500 m3 tank capacity for 
mud/brine is located below deck.  
During CT operation with riser, the kill pumps take suction from mud system and pump 
brine/sea water through CT. The return fluid in the riser annulus is led through flow tree and 
choke – MGS system. The kill system includes the following equipments: 
‐ 2 hose-reel and storage tank for killing fluid 
‐ 2 well service capacity pumps at 607 (t) min, 690 bar 
 
5.4.3 THE MUD SYSTEM 
 
The system is module built with a capacity of treating 40 cum/hr and consists of:  
‐ MGS – capacity 2MMscuf/d 
‐ Degasser, mixing hopper, shale shaker, Trip tank, sand trap, vacuum degasser tank, 
active tank, mixing tank, agitator, valves inter-connecting pipes and wire, mixing and 
transfer pump, local and remote control panels.  
‐ The inlet line to the MGS is hooked up from the choke manifold and the gas outlet is 
connected to the flare boom. 
‐ In case of excessive oil return from the well, an oil/water separator is required. The oil 
may be stored onboard if permitted, or flared according to PSA/UKCS regulations.  
For CT operation a flare boom of accepted capacity is required and shall be designed 
according to NORSOK specifications. It shall be located aft and be swang outwards to 
sea while burning gas/oil with vessel heading against wind. 
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5.5 RISERLESS WELL INTERVENTION CONTROL SYSTEM (MARK II) 
 
As mentioned earlier, the new vessel will be equipped with a new generation wireline control 
package termed Mark II. The system shall enable wire-line tools to access the well in a safe 
and controlled operation for personnel and environment. The system is designed for a suitable 
mono-hull vessel and run in 2 guideline wires assisted by ROV. The complete package is 
designed in three pieces and remains connected to the wellhead for the duration of operation. 
System specification for RLWI Mark II is provided in attachment 6.  
The subsea packages comprises of: 
• Well Control Package (WCP) including safety valves and safety head, 
• Lubricator Section (LS) including the lubricator pipe joint and a 7’/10’’ ball 
valve capable of cutting wire-line, 
• Seal Section (SS) provides a dynamic seal between sea and the pressure inside 
the LS (well). 
 
The new operation IWOCS system has been dramatically reduced in complexity and number 
of units. The traditional WOCS container with integrated HPU and operator room has been 
replaced by distributed HPU’s on the subsea equipment and the operator room integrated with 
the vessel’s control room. As a result of the 
distributed HPU’s and the grease injection 
system subsea, the umbilical has been reduced 
dramatically compared to the existing system, 
Mark I.  The biggest change from Mark I to Mark 
II RLWI system is the control system 
architecture. The Mark I control system is a 
combination of electro-hydraulic and direct 
hydraulic control systems with a surface HPU, 
surface chemical injection and grease injection 
system, using a large diameter multi-bore 
umbilical.  
The Mark II control system has been developed 
around the premise of eliminating the large 
cumbersome umbilical seen in figure 27, both to 
eliminate the heave-compensation bending issues 
and to enable much deeper water depth 
operations. Increased umbilical length often 
leads to larger diameter hoses in the umbilical 
between the surface HPU and subsea hardware 
to fend off the effects of fluid pressure loss and 
increased reaction time. An all-electric power 
umbilical similar to what is used for ROVs today 
is implemented in the system. However, the 
elimination of the hydraulic hoses from the 
umbilical requires that the HPUs, CIUs, and 
GIUs are moved from the topside facilities and 
implemented in the subsea equipment (20). 
 
Figure 27. Mark II RLWIS and the 
comparison of umbilical size for Mark I (left) 
and Mark II, ROV-type electric umbilical, 
(right).  
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5.6  COILED TUBING OPERATION  
 
For simplicity the description of features designed for CT operation has been divided into two 
parts making the well control package located subsea and topside including all equipments 
providing rotational motions, compensation, suspension and control and management of CT 
while RIH/POOH. For a clear understanding of system layout and data specification refer to 
attachment 7 and 8.  
 
5.6.1 DESIGN DATA/SPECIFICATION PER SYSTEM TOPSIDE 
 
5.6.1.1 TOP TENSION SYSTEM 
 
The tension system provides tension to CT Frame (CTF), Gimbal support (GSF) frame with 
Gimbal, swivel and compensator for the relative motion of the vessel. 
 
5.6.1.2 RISER TENSION SYSTEM 
 
Provides positive tension to the well intervention riser, and compensate for relative motion 
between riser and the vessel.  
 
5.6.1.3 IRON ROUGH NECK (MAKE AND BRAKE TOOL) 
 
The iron rough neck is required for assembly of the riser system. 
 
5.6.1.4 FALSE-ROTARY TABLE 
 
A false rotary table with a gimballed insert 37 ½’’ master bushing is required for hanging of 
the riser. 
 
5.6.1.5 RISER CENTRALIZING ARMS 
 
Installed in the lower part of the moon-pool to centralize/stabilize the riser string when 
required (Remotely controlled from control station on main deck). 
 
5.6.1.6 CT FRAME (STRUCTURAL) 
 
Provide self containing means for handling the CT Injector head, Tool String and Pressure 
Control equipment within the Module Handing Towel of the WIU.  
 
5.6.1.7 CT INJECTOR HEAD 
 
Used to convey the CT string for RIH and POOH of the well. It is equipped with a large 
radius gooseneck determine to minimize fatigue on tubing. The capacity of traction system for 
the injector head: 
• Continues pull – 80,000 lbs 
• Intermittent pull – 110,000 lbs 
• Snubbing capacity – 40,000 lbs 
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5.6.1.8 DUAL STRIPPER 
 
The unit is utilized for pack-off on CT as it stripped in and out of the well at pressures up to 
1000 psi. The packer provides preliminary barrier when energized.  2 door side door stripper 
comprises of a top element pack-off under normal circumstances, and in case of failure the 
lower element packer may be packed-off to maintain seal integrity.  
 
5.6.1.9 SURFACE CT BOP 
 
 The BOP Ram shall provide a means of shearing CT. The ram shall also, in 
conjunction with a surface tree valve, provide two means of sealing.  
 Shear seal ram shall provide a gas tight seal.  
 
5.6.1.10 CT POWER PACK 
 
Shall provide full operational power to all equipments within CT system and a local control 
shall be provided for critical functions.  
 
5.6.1.11 CT-REEL 
 
 Provide storage of CT string 
 Capacity for at least 20,000 feet of 2-3/8 CT with reel core maximized to minimize 
fatigue.  
 The unit shall have a life equivalent to 6 interventions each with 4 days in hole time.  
 
5.6.1.12 SURFACE FLOW TREE 
 
 The SFT assemblies shall be designed for easy handling and to mitigate the effects of 
riser motion.  
 Preferred valve type – a remote hydraulic operated metal-to-metal sealing gate. 
Operated under full differential well bore pressure and across the upper and lower 
temperature range.  
 Master valve is Fail-as-is design (hydraulic close/open) and wing valves fail safe close 
(bi-directional sealing capability).  
 
5.6.1.13 CT CURSOR FRAME WITH GIMBAL 
 
 GSF acts as a support for CTF and is connected to Top Tension System and taking the 
vertical loads from the CTF. 
 Gimbal installed at the upper part of GSF ensures free rotation of riser in storm hang 
off mode. Gimbal suspends riser in its full length and allows at least 10deg pendulum 
angle. It shall be equipped with a remote controlled riser centralizer keeping the riser 
vertical when necessary.  
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5.6.2 DESIGN DATA/SPECIFICATION FOR SYSTEM SUBSEA 
 
5.6.2.1 WCP/EDP INCLUDING RETAINER VALVE (RV).  
 
The WCP is the same as for RWLI MK II system made up of LLP and a RU module. WCP 
and EDP based on 7’/16’’ bore. The RV with Bi-directional sealing capability is operated 
through control modules already in place on WCP and LLP.  
 
5.6.2.2 LOWER TAPPER STRESS JOINT 
 
The Joint provides the riser system with a transitive zone of stiffness intermediate to the 
subsea tree and riser. Efficiently reduces highly localized stresses, thereby increasing fatigue 
life and improving operation envelop of the system. The joint minimizes as well transfer of 
riser loads into the XT and Wellhead.  
 
5.6.2.3 RISER WEAK LINK 
 
Designed to break under specified loads (tension) due to lock-up of Riser or Top tension 
System and shall not break in event of losses of station keeping. 
  
5.6.2.4 HIGH SET LUBRICATOR VALVE 
 
HSL designed to isolate the reservoir from environment when deploying long wire-line/CT 
tool string. The valve is safe fail as is designed (bi-directional sealing) and remote operated.  
 
5.6.2.5 RISER SYSTEM 
 
The design, manufacturing and operation of a riser system is in accordance with ISO 13628-7 
standard. The designed for installed equipments is for a 20 year life time and 10 years life 
span for Riser Joint with appropriate maintenance and 5 years life with target service 
(accumulated operation).  Risk Analysis ad Shut down/ disconnect philosophy are tools used 
to define the time requirement is with respect to EQD.  
 
The riser system should be able to satisfy the following under CT operation: 
 The integrity of Subsea WH, XT, re-entry connector/cross over are not compromised 
due to applied pressure and bending loads under normal operation or extreme and 
relevant accidental conditions. 
 The system shall include load limiting system to avoid any compromise to 
components below WCP in case of unplanned/accidental compensator failure event 
such as tensioner/compensator failure or vessel drive off/drift off. 
 HC release from the Well/ Riser should be avoided under operation (containment) and 
facilitate flushing/cleaning of HC release under normal operation. 
 Enable full bore vertical access to the TH and Down Hole Completion for intervention 
(wireline, e-line and CT deployed tooling). This includes as well full bore access for 
smooth passage of tools (unobstructed passage of drift tools) during RIH/POOH. 
 Provide safe withdraw from the well under safe response speed, disconnection angle 
under emergency and accommodate effective HC management. 
 Provide pressure integrity barrier under applied bending and tension loads on riser 
during flow back, injection testing and down hole intervention operations. 
• Incorporate suitable means for monitoring pressure. 
 53 
 
• Incorporate suitable means for flushing HC from Riser. 
• Be a conduit for transmission of all expected types of well bore fluids. 
 Incorporate an appropriate riser monitoring and telemetry system for measuring riser 
stresses and estimation of loads imposed to WH thus optimizing the operation envelop 
and vessel heading under given environmental conditions.  
 Ensure adequate protection of umbilicals at top side interface and route to avoid 
trapping between reciprocating parts during either installation/retrieval or operation.   
      
5.6.2.6  SWIVEL 
 
The swivel Installed at the upper end of the Riser String below the HSLV and permit 360deg 
rotation to allow vessel weather vaning. Its structural designed copes with the Riser Systems 
worst-case pressure, bending, tensile loading and capable of rotation under these conditions.  
 
5.6.2.7 MODULE HANDLING SYSTEM (MHS) 
 
Fully equipped with a Module Handling Tower, an integrated Moon-Pool Door System as 
well as a deck mounted Horizontal Skidding System. The MHS requires modification to 
perform CT operations i.e. increase height to accommodate CT injector frame and GSF.  
 
5.6.2.8 WIRE-LINE EQUIPMENT 
 
Same as installed in Island Constructor RLWI modus with addition of the following: 
 Wire-line BOP for standard rig up – to be rigged up in CT rig-up frame 
 Wire-line lubricator for standard surface rig up – to be rigged up in CT rig-up frame 
 GIH/Stuffing box for standard rig-up – to be rigged up in CT rig-up frame 
 BOP control panel – may be built in, remote operated and hard pipe from below deck.  
 Pressure test pump – may be built in remote operated and hard pipe from below deck 
 Additional BHA tool package for extension of Scope of Work (SOW) to fishing of 
wire.  
 
5.6.2.9 PROCESS SYSTEM INCLUDING FLARE 
 
Possible means for handling upstream flushing water contaminated with HC during CT 
operations are required. The system should be able to separate water from HC and flare the 
gas/oil (capable to handle 5-50% of oil content in water). High pressure flushing operation 
leads to flushing fluid contamination with particles requiring further treatment through the 
shake/sand trap.    
 
Island Constructor will be equipped with a brine/gas/water/gas recovery /separation system. 
The basic design for recovery of circulated fluid as seen in figure 28 is in conjunction with CT 
operations. Several different scenarios are taken into consideration in the design bases with 
regards to the Well status (live HC producing well, shut in well for intervention/ 
abandonment). Further more the design parameters are dependent on the treatment of return 
fluids from the well during CT operation. Under cleaning operation, the fluid used for Jet 
flushing will contain water, oil and sand particles requiring separation and perhaps there 
would be a necessity of total recovery of the circulation fluid.  
   
 
 54 
 
 
 
Figure 28. The system designed for treatment of circulation fluid contaminations during jet flushing 
operation. 
 
5.6.3 BARRIER PHILOSOPHY 
 
 Stringent requirement shall be followed and application of NORSOK D-010 
 Control system will produce alarm for PSD/ESD/EQD and the operator will trigger 
PSD/ESD/EQD from station depending on predefined conditions.  
 The Contractor shall identify the Primary and Secondary Barriers for each riser mode 
in each planned well operation. That will include an assessment of the impact of 
potential system configurations, conditions, and operations as well as shutdown 
scenarios.  
 Two independent mechanical barriers shall be in-place prior to removal of subsea 
equipment (e.g. EDP). The sea barriers may be a combination of active and passive 
barriers.  
 During connected operations, one primary barrier shall be in place and secondary shall 
be available and ready for activation which is independent to the primary. At least one 
of the barriers shall be mechanical where the primary may be a temporary barrier.  
 SCSSV may be used as a barrier in controlled shut-down events when successfully 
tested and it shall not be considered a barrier when well system is exposed to an 
unplanned event such as EQD, riser failure, etc.  
 In case of shearing operations, shear ram should be capable of sealing after shearing 
tool string.  
 Test for mechanical and active barriers shall be conducted on installation and prior to 
reservoir fluid exposure 
 Water is preferred as test fluid, however once reservoir fluids have been produced to 
the surface flushing by glycol is required to avoid hydrate formation.  
 Test shall include a low pressure test of 200 – 300 psi for 5 min before proceeding to 
the full-pressure test. All tests shall be recorded on appropriate chart. Prior to pressure 
testing, area shall be isolated and personnel evacuated.  
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5.7 LIMITATION WITH RESPECT TO AVAILABLE DECK SPACE 
 
The deck layout on Island constructor is limited due to scarcity of space to accommodate a 
cement processing module. For P&A operation it would be necessary to hire a cement mixer 
module or mixing facilities from other service providers for cementing operation. The flare 
system currently is still and discussion on whether it has to be installed onboard the facility 
and probably will not be installed for the same reason of deck space and other factors related 
to accessibly during maintenance work. It is known that congestion of equipments on small 
deck area may become an obstruction for performing inspection work as well difficulties in 
carrying out maintenance. 
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6.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
1. Based on the technology available today it is possible to utilize intervention facilities for 
permanent plugging and abandonment of subsea wells and WH removal campaign. Some 
of the technical issues have been analyzed and concluded to suggest the main conclusion.  
 
 Methods for killing the well in a case of a live well, have became common practice 
therefore it do not pose any challenge on gaining well control.  The industry has gain more 
knowledge and experience with respect to deployment of tools downhole by wireline and 
CT through open water and well control system (WCP, EDP, SLIS and WOICS) which is 
well known and proven technology.  Technology advancement has accelerated lately and 
led to the development of fit for purpose and new state of the art systems which are more 
reliable like new generation of Mk II SLIS and small bore riser systems.  
 
 The production tubing has no economical value at the end of production life cycle of the 
well; therefore it may be plugged and left in place considering that there are no 
requirements of recovery embedded by regulatory bodies and still when removed may 
require costly treatment before disposal.   
 
 
 The possibility of setting expandable mechanical plugs through tubing by wireline justifies 
that permanent barrier can be established extending up to a 13 3/8”casing. The BOP on 
WCP is designed with a drift diameter that can accommodate a toolstring not exceeding 7” 
OD.  Access between casing strings can be established by oriented explosive charges, and 
cement slurry pumped through the production tubing. Perforating gun design, deployment 
technology and detonation methods have been optimized, though still it is necessary to 
account for risks involved by handling explosives with care. Tractors which are cost 
effective wireline conveyance tools for toolstring in horizontal wells can be used to deploy, 
anchor electric cutting tool and perform production tubing cutting without adding HSE 
risks. This wireline cutting technique is advantageous compared to the conventional 
wireline operation by use of explosives.  
 
2. Economically the use of small intervention facilities is a viable solution: 
 
P&A can be performed by utilizing a small intervention facility since the end product is 
dictated by advancement of engineering solution available and equipment availability. The rig 
approach involves the application of full workover equipments as for completion work with 
straightforward known results and in contrary increases the operation cost due to time of 
mobilization/demobilization. Rig-less method by wireline and CT approach will be less 
expensive due to reduction in time of mobilization and it is faster to RIH and POOH when 
setting plugs. Mechanical malfunction during wireline operation may lead to fishing 
operations, increase in downtime and hence a slight cost overrun for the P&A operation.        
 
Based on the arguments provided and the techniques associated with plug setting downhole, it 
is recommended that P&A should be preformed by WI/RLWI VESSELs as a complementary 
solution to the use of drilling rig.  
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7.0 RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH WORK 
 
1. Weather and dynamic  load acceleration. 
 
The main challenge is associated with limitation on small facilities MHT and derrick system 
rated carrying capacity which is governed by the location water depth and weather condition. 
Basically depth determines the connection length of riser systems and wave induced dynamic 
load coupled to the weight of WCP, EDP for intervention activities.  So far the design of the 
riser system for Island Constructor is limited to 600m though the crane system has a limited 
lifting capacity of up to 1000m. Dynamic behavior of small facilities should further be 
research to increase the operation window for deeper water of above 1000m.  
 
2. Improvement of exciting capabilities beyond 1000m. 
  
Seen from this aspect, the only viable solution to perform P&A for wells located deeper that 
600m is by the use of ROV deployed tools coupled with long hoses (umbilical) for circulation 
of fluid into and from the well. Special crossover tools with double packer have to be 
designed taking into consideration the establishment of sufficient well control barrier as 
required by the authority prior to initiation of severing the casing strings susceptible of 
containing SCP.     
 
3. Standardization of WH profile 
 
The variation of WH profiles and dimension apart from H-4 WH system, poses another 
challenge due to the fact that the profile has not been standardized. For that reason, it would 
be necessary to carry onboard different sizes of WH to WCP interface or crossover adapters to 
provide a pressure contain element between them before control of SCP in annuli spaces is 
performed.  
 
4. Improvement of downhole technology for light small facility type of 
operations. 
 
It will be wise to carry out an extensive research on cement and steel casing bonding factor 
since, over time the reservoir pressure and temperature will build up. The thermal stresses 
induced on the steel material may become lead to debonding of the cement sheath and casing 
forming migrating routes for reservoir fluids.  The best solution will be to squeeze cement to 
the rock below the production casing, where cement seepage into the bedrock providing a 
permanent and solid bonding blocking the possibility of HC migration below the production 
tubing shoe. This can be accomplished by first window milling of a section of the production 
tubing without recovery to the surface of cuttings. Unfortunately per today, wireline and CT 
operation are limited to scale, and plug million operations, therefore a study should be carried 
out to enhance section milling by wireline and CT.   
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Attachment 1 
 
Meeting with PSA – Mr. Stein A. Tonning on rules and regulations regarding construction of 
mobile offshore facilities on 06th February 2009, Stavanger 
Cases to be discussed: 
 
1. Standards, NORSOK Standard and Petroleum Act. 
2. Shut in well categorization system applied by PSA: 
 Oil and Gas UK categorization of shut in wells. 
3. Application for Acknowledgment of Compliance for small facilities 
(Samsvarsuttalelse – SUT):  
 NCA and IOSS, expansion of activities in decommissioning.  
4. Experience: 
 Requirement on cutting casing strings  
 Use of explosives  
 Jet cutting 
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Meeting with NCA – Mr. Per Lund on Plugging and Abandonment on 06th March 2009, 
Stavanger 
Cases to be discussed: 
 
1.0 Well shut in  
 
1.1 Killing the well 
1.2 Plug setting 
 
2.0 Evaluation, discussion and recommendation on  “safe” methods for handling trapped 
gas and hydrocarbons under pressure in annuli spaces. 
 
2.1 Technical methods for containing trapped gas in annular space during bleed off. 
2.2 Technical methods for containing and circulating trapped hydrocarbon liquid in 
annular spaces during bleed off.   
 
3.0 Wellhead cutting and lifting 
 
3.1 Wellbore clean out 
3.2 Production tubing/string removal in open water 
3.3 Jet cutting 
3.4 Wellhead pick up 
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Meeting with Island Offshore – Mr. Bernt Gramstand on 11th March 2009 on Plugging and 
Abandonment, Stavanger 
Cases to be discussed: 
 
1. Re-entry of the well category 2 
a. Wireline 
i. Subsea Intervention Lubricator System 
ii. Workover tools 
1. Setting of bridge plugs 
2. Establishment of bleed off SCP and circulation path 
3. Circulation of cement  
b. Coil tubing 
i. Rig up & down of workover equipments 
ii. Circulation system 
c. Recovery of wellhead 
 
2. Re-entry of well category 3. 
a. Killing the well 
b. Coil tubing 
i. Rig up & down of workover equipments 
ii. Establishment of bleed off SCP and circulation path 
iii. Cleaning up 
iv. Setting of mechanical and cement plugs 
v. Storage of hydrocarbon 
c. Recovery of wellhead 
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Meeting with Island Offshore – Mr. Robert Friedberg on Comparison of Registration 
Requirements for an installation vs a Vessel on 27th March 2009, Stavanger 
Cases to be discussed: 
 
 
1. What exactly are the key points regarding regulations that differential an installation 
from a vessel 
 
2. Which SUT requirements are considered necessary when a vessel is converted into an 
installation? 
 
3. For new build fit for purpose LWI units, are there any kinds of SUT exemptions 
provided by the NPA? 
 
 Ships hull and strength of construction material  
 Ship stability and ballast system 
 Machinery and emergency electrical power supply 
 Topside equipments including systems for well control 
 Anchorage , mooring  and positioning with respect to DP class  
 
4. Safety requirements  
 
 Navigation systems 
 Manning of LWI units 
 Rescue equipments and life saving appliances  (types of life boat) 
 Minimum requirements for corridor and ladder 
 Detection (fire and gas detectors) and protection systems 
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Attachment 2 
 
Interview with Mr. Robert Friedberg at Island Offshore, 27th March 2009, Stavanger.  
 
The key points regarding construction and registration of an installation and a vessel for 
offshore activities is mainly associated with the regulations set by regulatory authorities, 
NMD which is the Norwegian flag state, Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority PSA, 
International Maritime Organization IMO and classification societies like DNV, and 
guidelines stipulated in offshore standards like NORSOK in the NCS. 
 
According to Mr. Robert the main few key elements are based on the stringent requirements 
on documentation for an installation in contrast to a vessel. The following factors where 
discussed with regards to the construction of an installation with respect to a vessel: 
 
1. Factors related to construction of an installation vs a vessel:  
 
 Size of the organization onshore for project follow up and a team required to plan the 
project is more substantial for a mobile offshore unit than for a vessel. There would be 
a minimum of 5 people working for preparing documentation for an installation and 
the project follow up during construction will require several experts in contrast to a 
vessel where chief engineer and captain will be satisfactory to make follow up during 
construction at shipyard. In most cases yards will provide necessary certificates for a 
vessel that would be required for NMD compliancy, in contrast for an installation 
where Ptil requires full documentation. 
 
 A contractor have to abide to the (i) operator specific requirements where the size of 
documentation provided by an operating company will require a lot time to go through 
for compliance, and (ii) a installation compliancy to the SUT (safety case) 
requirements posed by PSA. 
 
 There is a strong documentation requirement set by PSA for traceability of equipments 
and components in a system such that in case of failure that could ease investigation 
by tracing back on its origin. Other factors concerns: 
(i) Evaluation for criticality analysis involving frequency of failure and 
consequences. 
(ii) Contingency plan and redundancy with respect to consequences and safety 
risks associated with system failure to personnel, environment and property. 
 
2. Factors related to operation of an installation vs a vessel:  
 Stricter regulation for training and certification of crew and work schedules. 
Additional cost in manning of an installation due to the work rotation of 2 weeks on 
and 4 weeks off in contrast to that of  a vessel where crew works in a rotation of 4 
weeks on and 4 weeks off. 
 Working environment with respect to ergonomics, noise and vibration reduction, and 
lighting condition for safety of crew. 
 
The construction costs for a mobile offshore unit would be considerably higher than that of a 
vessel. PSA requirements leads to additional costs, where we may find that equipment 
manufacturers are forced to deviate from original standard specifications for production of 
specific equipment in order to suit specific requirements for an installation.   He gave an 
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example for ergonomics where it is required to have means of adjusting a DP consol height so 
that it would be comfortable for DP controller. Since such kind of adjustable consol may not 
be available on the market, it may require a specific order to be pressed thus increasing 
additional costs.  Further, the authority requires standard size of rooms in living quarters, 
recreation rooms and daylight illumination thereby increasing dimensions for windows. 
 
 
 
Flow diagram illustrating the business hierarch in the oil industry 
 
There is a need for a cost benefit consideration to avoid unreasonable costs to rules 
application, but PSA requires full documentation for compensating measures to deviation 
acceptance. 
 
Further, a question was raised on whether it is possible and would be cost beneficial to 
convert an operating vessel like an AHTS to a RLWI installation. 
 
He commented that, SUT requirements make it difficult to convert a normal operating vessel 
(supply boat) to a fit for purpose LWI installation due to the expected costs. It is worth 
constructing a new vessel with full SUT requirements since reconstructing and fitting an old 
vessel with topside well control system and equipments would be extremely expensive.  He 
said PSA will accept a vessel build with NMD certificates, but it should comply with the SUT 
requirements to work in petroleum activities. Island Offshore has built LWI units with clean 
design (DNV) and these facilities comply with SUT requirements. 
 
Operator Company eg. StatoilHydro
Contractor eg. Island Offshore
Ship Yard eg. Aker Yard
Sub - Contractor eg. Equipment Supplier 
 Aker Solution – Wireline 
 FMC – SLIS & IWCS 
ROV Sub-
State Regulatory Body eg. PSA
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Attachment 8 
 
1. General design requirements 
1.1 Design Data  
Design Data refers to SOR rev 4 
1.2 Environmental Criteria 
The following design criteria shall be considered for the design of the Riser System 
for Schiehallion. 
Maximum Water 600m 
Minimum Water 300m 
Seawater Ambient 4º C 
 
1.3 Well Operations ­ Well Conditions 
Producer Well  
Well Head Flowing Pressure 1200 psi 
Well Head Shut-In Pressure 2500 psi 
Operating Pressure 1000 psi 
Well Head Flowing 
Temperature
60° C 
Well Head Shut In 
Temperature
4° C 
 
Injector Well  
Reverse Circulation Pressure 4500 psi 
‘Conventional Circulation’ 
Pressure 1500 psi 
Injection Pressure 4000 psi 
 
Bullheading Pressure 4000 psi 
 
1.4 High volume pumping activities 
Rate 30 bpm 
Fracture stimulation 5000 bbls, able to pump and filter 
Acid sufficient to achieve 
 50bpm. ( probably around 2500 bbls concentrated acid) 
Brightwater +/- 1000000 bbls 
 Polymer concentration of 
 
1.5% typical so 98.5% seawater and 
1500 bbls of polymer for a 1 
million bbl treatment. 
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1.5 Operational Durations (Connected) 
CT PLT on producer / 
injectors 
CT Cleanout on Producer / 
injectors Riser deployment of  
i li l i
21 days 
High volume pumping 
activities 
  48 hours to 30 
days 
1.6 Well circulation capabilities 
Full Flow Water Pumped from 
FPSO Reverse Return Flow 
(CT) Pump Rate 1500 L/min 
Return Fluid 99.5% water 
Return flow processed and 
discharged to sea 
Full Flow Hydrocarbon Return 
(CT) Pump Rate 1500 L/min 
Closed Loop Hydrocarbon Return 
Sand, scale and metal particles 
present in flow 
Full Flow Hydrocarbon Return and 
Flowing Well 
(CT) Pump Rate 1500 L/min 
Well flow rate 660 L/min 
Total Return Flow 2160 L/min 
Flare capability 660 L/min 
Sand, scale and metal particles 
present in flow 
Gas Injection NA 
 
1.7 Surface Tree and BOP 
Surface Tree gate valves and BOP ram requirements are presented in the following 
Table. 
Nominal Bore SFT 7 1/16” 
Nominal Bore Coil Tubing BOP 4 1/16” 
Design Pressure 5,000 psi 
1.8 Riser Criteria 
Riser Criteria Design Parameter 
Design Life (Total)  
Service Life (In operation) 
10 Years 
5 Years 
Design Pressure 5000 psi 
Riser Maximum Temperature 82° C 
Riser Minimum Temperature -18° C 
Riser drift 
Reference Riser Case  
Minimized Riser Case 
6.437” 
4.86” 
Internal Corrosion Allowance max 3.0 mm allowed 
CT OD CT Wall Thickness CT 
Grade 
2 3/8” ~ 2 7/8” 
0.203” 
QT900 - 95 ksi 
 87 
 
Slick line and Braided line Sizes 0.092” to 0.125” Slick line 7/32”  to  7/32” and 5/16” Braided line 
E-Line Sizes                Mono, 7/32” – 5/16” – 7/16”                              Hepta, 15/32” 
Gases Nitrogen Internal pressure 
Fluid pH 5.2 
Chemicals 
H2S≤ 500ppm 
CO2 ≤1 mol % 
N≤0.274 mol % (HOLD) 
Riser Criteria Design Parameter 
Injected/Introduced Fluids/Gases 
Glycol (1097 kg/m3) 
Methanol (790 kg/m3) 
Completion Brine (1200 kg/m3) 
Nitrogen (HOLD) 
Inhibited Seawater (1025 kg/m) 
Scale Inhibition Chemicals (1000 kg/m3) 
Solids Sand: 2 kg per 1000 bbls
 
1.9 Riser Connector/Couplings 
VIV Fatigue Safety Factor 
Wave induced Fatigue Safety 
F t
20                      
10 
Non re-cut capable connectors 
Minimum No Make/Break Cycles 100 
Repairable Connectors 
Minimum No Make/Break Cycles 
25 with minimum of three re-cuts 
possible for Pin and Box ends 
 
1.10 Emergency Disconnect Package 
Minimum Make/Break Cycles 
(One ‘cycle’ defined as latching, 
 then unlatching the connector)
25 
 
1.11 Subsea Tree Weight & Dimensions 
Tree Weight (Dual Bore 7” x 
2”) 41 tonnes 
Tree Running Tool (estimate 
inclusive of Speed loc Lift Cap) 18 tonnes 
Cursor Guide Frame 4 tonnes 
(Dual Bore 7” x 2” - Plan  
Length* 199” [5055 mm] 
Width** 132” [3353 mm] 
* Equidistant from Mandrel centre 
** Offset from Mandrel centre line 76” and 56” respectively 
 
